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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 18 …Leghorn persuaded his superiors to submit his suggestion to the Pentagon for funding. He had not…
  • p. 20 …Meanwhile Leghorn, frustrated by the rejection of his original concept, had transferred to the Pentagon in…
  • p. 22 …become the assistant director of Lockheed's Advanced Development Program, was in the Pentagon on business…
  • p. 24 …for the construction and maintenance of 30 aircraft to a group of senior Pentagon official s…
  • p. 26 …He had been present at Kelly Johnson's presentation on the CL-282 at the Pentagon…
  • p. 27 …with Strong in the Pentagon on 12 May 1954, six clays before the Wright Air Deve…
  • p. 52 …Late on the morning of 2 December 1954, Dulles told Bissell to go to the Pentagon…
  • p. 91 …He then briefed a high-level Pentagon panel that included the Secretary of the Air Force…
  • p. 92 …After a half hour passed, the base commander called the Pentagon to ask where the crippled…
  • p. 225 …By 25 September 1957, the National Security Council had become concerned with the course of events…
  • p. 251 …Early in 1963 the Agency sought special funds from the Pentagon to de velop a high…
  • p. 363 …CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War fl. New York: William Morrow, 1986. ---. The Soviet…
185
The Prettyman Board's finding was based on a large body of evi
dence indicating that Powers was telling the truth about the events of
I May 1960: the testimony of the experts who had debriefed Powers
after his return; a thorough investigation of Powers' background with
testimony by doctors, psychiatrists, former Air Force colleagues, and
his commander at Adana; Powers' own testimony before the board;
the results of a polygraph examination that he had volunteered to un
dergo; and the evidence provided by photographs of the wreckage of
his aircraft, which Kelly Johnson had analyzed and found consistent
with Powers' story. Nevertheless, DCI McCone remained skeptical.
He asked the Air Force to convene its own panel of experts to check
Johnson's assessment of the photographs of the U-2. The Air Force
quickly complied, and the panel supported Johnson's findings.
McCone then seized upon the one piece of evidence that contradicted
Powers' testimony-a report by the National Security Agency (NSA)
that suggested that Powers may have descended to a lower altitude
and turned back in a broad curve toward Sverdlovsk before being
downed-and ordered the Prettyman Board to reconvene on I March
for another look at this evidence. The board remained unconvinced by
NSA's thin evidence and stuck to its original findings. A few days lat
er, on 6 March 1962, Powers appeared before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, which commended his actions. The Senate
Foreign Relations Committee also held brief hearings on the U-2
Affair, with DCI McCone representing the CIA.-'-'
Although all of these inquiries found Powers to have acted prop
erly, they did not release many of their favorable findings to the pub
lic, which had received a very negative image of Powers' behavior
from sensational press reports and statements by public figures who
were not aware of (or chose to ignore) the truth about Powers· actions
while in captivity. One member of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Senator John J. Williams, expressed concern about the
impact of this silence on Powers' reputation in a question to DCI
McCone on 6 March 1962: "Don't you think he is being left with just
a little bit of a cloud hanging over him? If he did everything he is
supposed to do, why leave it hanging?" ,s Doubts about Powers did
remain in the public mind because he received no public recognition
for his efforts to withhold information from the Soviets. He was also
"' Beschloss. Mayday. p. 352-35-k Thomas Powers. Man Wlzo Kept the Secrets. p. 328;
Prettyman Board. DCI records (S).
" United States Congress. Senate. Foreign Relations Committee. £recutive Sessions of tlze
Sencae Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series). vol. 12. 86th Congre.~s. Second
Session... Report on the U-2 Incident." 6 March 1962. p. 265 (declassified 1982).
Secret NOfiotUd
Chapter 4
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.