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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …Ry, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems w21s the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell 's weather research cover re…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 157 …2 flight over the Black Sea that never violated Soviet airspace revealed 12 attempts at interception…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threat,ening as the blockade of l 948…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig inal U-2s with the 175 engines. 10" Detachment…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 194 …program in I 974, but RAF pilots never again conducted an overt1ight in an Agency U…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on l May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pil,ots never…
  • p. 227 …Both were expe rienced with World War II aircraft, although Vito had never flown the rebels…
  • p. 248 …It was short of both pilots and planes and never had more than three U-2s…
  • p. 257 …This was an electronic intelligence mission that, in ac cordance with the new guidelines, never came…
  • p. 264 251 Seu et NOFOAN Chapter 5 There was never another Agency U-2 mission from an…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabii izers." THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the 158 was never used in a Navy aircraft. "OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 303 …the J58 had to reach performance levels never before achieved by a jet engine. while operating…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and lockon modes, a fact that…
  • p. 317 …strongly opposed it and the 303 Committee never forwarded the proposal to President Johnson. 5" The…
  • p. 318 …The OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain, taxied to the runway and took off…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in Chielf…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
  • p. 348 …a 16-kilogram VHF recorder for communications intelligence (COMINT), was never used and was transferred to…
  • p. 349 …a mission over the Soviet Union that never took place. Systems-XI through XV were ECM…
  • p. 356 …Project SANDY HOOK never advanced very far in develop ment; projected high costs and substantial technical…
182
Secret NOFOfUd
Chapter 4
Japanese Government, faced with growing anti-American sentiment
and complaints in the press about the presence of "spyplanes" on
Japanese territory, asked the United States to remove the U-2s. The
very next day the CIA closed Detachment C; its U-2s were disman
tled and returned to the United States aboard C-124s.37
[n the midst of the furor in Japan. on l July 1960, just six weeks
after the Paris Summit, Soviet fighter aircraft shot down an Air Force
RB-47 on an electronic intelligence collection mission over interna
tional waters near the Soviet Union's Kola Peninsula. Two survivors
were captured. The Soviet Union claimed that the aircraft had vio
lated its airspace, while the United States denounced the Soviets for
downing the plane over international waters. The acrimony exacer
bated an already tense international atmosphere. 3"
One additional blow to the U-2 program came in the summer of
I960. NASA, concerned about the damage to its reputation from its
involvement in the U-2 affair and hoping to obtain international coop
eration for its space program. decided to end its support of the cover
story that U-2s were conducting weather research under its auspices.'''
These developments resulted in a complete halt to all U-2 opera
tions from overseas bases for more than six months. Pilots and air
craft from Detachments B and C were consolidated into Detachment
G at Edwards Air Force Base, California. the unit formed after the
C[A had vacated the Nevada testing site in 1957 as a result of AEC
nuclear testing. Detachment G now comprised eight pilots from
Detachment B and three pilots from Detachment C. Because Powers'
capture had compromised Project CHALICE, the Agency assigned a
new cryptonym to the U-2 effort; henceforth, it was called Project
IDEALIST.""
" OSA Chronology. p. 28 (TS Codeword).
" "Mystery of the RB--+7," Newsweek. 25 July 1960. pp. 36-37: .. Nikita and the RB--+7."'
Time. 25 July I960. pp. 30-31.
,., At a meeting of high-levt:1 CIA. NASA. and State Department ofticials on 31 May 1960,
NASA was willing to continue its association with U-2 flights for the time being. but the
Administrator of NASA. Dr. Keith Glennan. believed that his agency "would be well ad
vised to disengage from the U-2 program as rapidly as possible." James A. Cunningham.
Memorandum for the Record. ··Tdephont: Conversation with Dr. Hugh Dryden, Deputy
Director, NASA," I June 1960. DPD chrono tile #.+553-60. OSA records (S).
"' OSA Hisrorv, chap. !2. pp. -H--+9; chap. 16. p. 10 (TS Codeword).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.