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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …following day, when the next U-2 mission f m the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 ( 18 March 1957), OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 7…
  • p. 142 …where they would not interfere with the control surfaces. At the ends of these poles, completely…
  • p. 147 …To take ad vantage of these weaknesses, Detachment C staged three missions from Alaska into the…
  • p. 156 …After these missions, penetrat ion overflights became a rarity. There would be only six more during…
  • p. 167 …U-2 missions. To handle U-2 material, the British created a new control system, which…
  • p. 168 …The British missions would be operationally controlled by CIA project headquarters. Soon afterward four British pilots…
  • p. 169 …where the United Kingdom carried out 27 missions during the two years its pi lots took…
  • p. 170 157 Sec, et MOF'ORI\I Chapter 3 May 1959, and used to fly weather missions…
  • p. 180 …The excellent photography from tnis mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts diid…
  • p. 188 …some Soviet airborne-missile fire-control systems. Operation GRAND SLAM, mission 4154 and the 24th deep…
  • p. 191 …key project personnel assembled in the Agency control center that morning (with the exception of Bissell…
  • p. 196 …in cor respondence with Abel's "wife., (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November…
  • p. 204 …in .the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 237 …In reality, however, the United States would maintain strict control over the missions to be flown…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
  • p. 348 …System-I used S- and X-band ELINT receivers to collect ground-controlled intercept and air…
  • p. 400 387 Sec1 et NOFORN mission 2023 108 mission 2029 124 mission 3086 200 mission 3088 200…
181
Sec, et ~OFORI\I
Chapter 4
Eisenhower stated that overflights had been suspended and would not
be resumed, but he refused to make a formal apology. At that point
the summit ended, as did all hopes for a visit to the Soviet Union by
President Eisenhower.
THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE
OVERSEAS DETACHMENTS
The loss of Powers' U-2 ultimately resulted in the end of Detachment
B in Turkey. As soon as the Development Projects Division learned
that Powers was alive in Soviet hands, it immediately evacuated the
British pilots from Adana to protect the secret of their involvement in
the project. Project officials hoped that tlights might eventually re
sume from Adana, but President Eisenhower's order ending over
flights of the Soviet Union made this very unlikely. Less than four
weeks later. a coup ousted the government of Turkish Premier Adnan
Menderes on the night of 27 May 1960. Because the new government
had not been briefed on the U-2, Project Headquarters refused to al
l_Qw any U-2 tlights from Adana, even those necessary for maintain
ing the aircraft's airworthiness. As a result, no more U-2s flew out of
Adana. Instead of being ferried home, three of the four remaining
U-2s were disassembled and loaded aboard C-124 cargo planes for
the return trip to the United States."'
The fourth U-2 remained inside a hangar at Incirlik airbase for
several years, looked after by a skeleton crew, in case the Adana in
stallation needed to be reactivated. Finally the decision was made to
close down the Adana U-2 facility. During Detachment B's 44 months
of active existence, 21 pilots had flown its aircraft, including four
RAF pilots and three pilots transferred from the deactivated
Detachment A. Fourteen Detachment B pilots were later assigned to
other U-2 detachments, but the closing down of Detachment B marked
the end of Britain's direct involvement in U-2 operational overflights.
A four-man unit of RAF U-2 pilots was stationed at Detachment G,
Edwards AFB, until the end of the CIA U-2 program in I 974, but
RAF pilots never again conducted an overt1ight in an Agency U-2.
The loss of Powers' U-2, the resultant failure of the Paris
Summit, and the end of U-2 operations in Turkey were just the first in
a series of setbacks for the U-2 program. On 8 July 1960, the
'• OSA History. chap. 12. pp. 46-47 (TS Codeword).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.