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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …following day, when the next U-2 mission f m the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 ( 18 March 1957), OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 7…
  • p. 142 …where they would not interfere with the control surfaces. At the ends of these poles, completely…
  • p. 147 …To take ad vantage of these weaknesses, Detachment C staged three missions from Alaska into the…
  • p. 156 …After these missions, penetrat ion overflights became a rarity. There would be only six more during…
  • p. 167 …U-2 missions. To handle U-2 material, the British created a new control system, which…
  • p. 168 …The British missions would be operationally controlled by CIA project headquarters. Soon afterward four British pilots…
  • p. 169 …where the United Kingdom carried out 27 missions during the two years its pi lots took…
  • p. 170 157 Sec, et MOF'ORI\I Chapter 3 May 1959, and used to fly weather missions…
  • p. 180 …The excellent photography from tnis mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts diid…
  • p. 188 …some Soviet airborne-missile fire-control systems. Operation GRAND SLAM, mission 4154 and the 24th deep…
  • p. 191 …key project personnel assembled in the Agency control center that morning (with the exception of Bissell…
  • p. 196 …in cor respondence with Abel's "wife., (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November…
  • p. 204 …in .the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 237 …In reality, however, the United States would maintain strict control over the missions to be flown…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
  • p. 348 …System-I used S- and X-band ELINT receivers to collect ground-controlled intercept and air…
  • p. 400 387 Sec1 et NOFORN mission 2023 108 mission 2029 124 mission 3086 200 mission 3088 200…
178
Secret l'JOFORl'J
Chapter 4
that the Soviets had discontinued radar tracking of the flight 's pro
gress two hours earlier (0529Z), southwest of Sverdlovsk. Although
there was no word from the Soviet Union concerning the mi:ssing
U-2. key project personnel assembled in the Agency control center
that morning (with the exception of Bissell. who was out of town and
did not arrive until 1530) to analyze the latest information and discuss
courses of action. They quickly established a new project. known as
Operation MUDLARK. co gather and evaluate all available informa
tion about the downed U-2."
Bissell and the other project officials did not know wh,ether
Powers was dead or if the plane and camera had been destroyed', but
they believed chat there was no way that a pilot could survive a crash
from an altitude above 70,000 feet. They. therefore, decided to stick
with the standard cover story for U-2 fl ights: that they were we:acher
flights staged by the National Aeronautics and Space Administr:ation
(NASA)-originally the National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics. renamed in 1958. This cover story had been approve:d by
the President in 1956.
By the end of the day, the Operation MUDLARK officials had
prepared a statement based on the standard cover story but modified
to fie the available information on Powers· flight and to show Adana
as the aircraft's base in order to conceal Pakistan's role in the mission.
This revised cover story, along with a mission flight plan consistent
with it, was sent to the field commander at Adana, co Air Force
Europe headquarters. and co the Chief of Station at Ankara to replace
the cover story that had been prepared and distributed in advance of
the mission. The first announcement of the new cover story came, late
on 2 May by the Adana base commander, but it did not appear in print
until the following day. On Tuesday, 3 May, NASA released a state
ment about a high-altitude weather plane that was missing on a flight
inside Turkey. The statement had been designed to provide an e>epla
nation for the presence of wreckage inside the Soviet Union by noting
that "the pilot reported over the emergency frequency that he was ex
periencing oxygen difficulties.,. .,: Thus. if the Soviets protested and
pointed to wreckage inside their borders, NASA could claim that the
pilot had lost consciousness and the aircraft had then flown into the
Soviet Union before crashing.
'' Geary incerview (S).
'' Beschloss. Mayday. p. 39.

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.