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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 19 …staff was the RB-57D in I 955, whose maximum altitude RAF Canberra Mark-PR3 Seeret
  • p. 36 …In 1952 the Royal Air Force (RAF) began Project ROBIN, which was designed to modify the…
  • p. 106 …The U-2s were to use Lakenheath AFB, an RAF base also used by the USAF…
  • p. 107 …penetrated the British radar net work, causing RAF fighters to scramble. Afterward the Air Ministry made…
  • p. 122 …twin-engine Canberra bomber, similar to the RAF overflight of Kapustin Yar in 1953. The US…
  • p. 156 …Range for the first time since the RAF's overflight in 1953, obtaining photographs of a…
  • p. 166 …In November 1958, four RAF officers arrived at Detachment B at Adana. thus beginning the United…
  • p. 167 …ask Air Vice Marshal MacDonald if the RAF was prepared to '"" See, for ex:ample, the…
  • p. 168 …MacDonald agreed to Bissell's proposal and began recruiting RAF pilots to fly the U-2…
  • p. 169 …Most flights by the RAF pilots in Detachment B, however, took place in the Middle East…
  • p. 177 …For almost a year, the RAF pilots of Detachment B had been ready to fly over…
  • p. 194 …A four-man unit of RAF U-2 pilots was stationed at Detachment G, Edwards AFB…
  • p. 200 …approval authority for missions conducted by the RAF pilots in Detachment 8. The loss of Powers…
  • p. 316 …Project IDEALIST U-2 flying from an RAF facility in Great Britain. The OXCART would fly…
  • p. 332 …1960, the need for British participation lessened. RAF pilots henceforth flew only training or ferry missions…
  • p. 339 …P-E PFIAB PI PIC PID PSAC RAF RFP SAB SAC SAC SA/PC/DCI SAM…
  • p. 351 …4154 Powers Peshawar B B Tyuratam, Kyshtym, Sverdlovsk; downed by SAM a RAF pilot Sec1 et
  • p. 402 …Louis 29 Watertown Strip 57 Watton RAF Base. England 156 "weather plane" cover story 179 weather…
177
See, et NOFORN
Chapter 4
area. The plane began spiraling down toward the ground and Powers
looked for a way out. Unable to use the ejection seat because centrifu
gal force had thrown him against the canopy, he released the canopy
and prepared to bail out, waiting to arm the destruction device at the
last minute, so that it would not go off while he was still in the plane.
When he released his seatbelt, however, he was immediately sucked
out of the aircraft and found himself dangling by his oxygen hose, un
able to reach the destruction switches. Finally, the hose broke and he
tlew away from the falling aircraft. After he fell several thousand
feet, his parachute opened automatically, and he drifted to earth where
he was quickly surrounded by farmers and then by Soviet officials.29
His aircraft had not been destroyed by the crash, and the Soviets were
able to identify much of its equipment when they put it on display 10
days later. Even if Powers had been able to activate the destruction
device, however, it would not have destroyed the aircraft. The small
explosive charge was only designed to wreck the camera.
How had the Soviets succeeded in downing the U-2? Although
some CIA project officials initially wondered if Powers had been fly
i_ng too low through an error or mechanical malfunction, he main
tained that he had been flying at his assigned altitude and had been
brought down by a near miss of a Soviet surface-to-air missile. This
turned out to be the case, for in March 1963, the US air attache in
Moscow learned that the Sverdlovsk SA-2 battery had fired a
three-missile salvo that, in addition to disabling Powers' plane, also
scored a direct hit on a Soviet fighter aircraft sent aloft to intercept
the U-2.'0 Mission planners had not known about this SAM site be
fore the mission because they always laid out flight plans to avoid
known SAM sites.
THE AFTERMATH OF THE U-2 DOWNING
The first indication that something was wrong with Powers' m1ss1on
came even before he was overdue at Bodo, Norway. The CIA
Operations Center learned on l May at 0330 hours Washington time
'' Powers, Operation Overjliglzt. pp. 82-84; Beschloss. Mayday, pp. 26-28: Transcript of
Debriefing Tapes of Francis Gary Powers, 13 February 1962. Board of Inquiry on the
Conduct of Francis Gary Powers, Operations MUDLARK tiles, OSA records. job
74-8-605, box 6 (S).
"' Cunningham interview, 4 October 1983 (TS Codeword); OSA History, chap. 14, p. 55
(TS Codeword).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.