Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …following day, when the next U-2 mission f m the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 ( 18 March 1957), OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 7…
  • p. 142 …where they would not interfere with the control surfaces. At the ends of these poles, completely…
  • p. 147 …To take ad vantage of these weaknesses, Detachment C staged three missions from Alaska into the…
  • p. 156 …After these missions, penetrat ion overflights became a rarity. There would be only six more during…
  • p. 167 …U-2 missions. To handle U-2 material, the British created a new control system, which…
  • p. 168 …The British missions would be operationally controlled by CIA project headquarters. Soon afterward four British pilots…
  • p. 169 …where the United Kingdom carried out 27 missions during the two years its pi lots took…
  • p. 170 157 Sec, et MOF'ORI\I Chapter 3 May 1959, and used to fly weather missions…
  • p. 180 …The excellent photography from tnis mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts diid…
  • p. 188 …some Soviet airborne-missile fire-control systems. Operation GRAND SLAM, mission 4154 and the 24th deep…
  • p. 191 …key project personnel assembled in the Agency control center that morning (with the exception of Bissell…
  • p. 196 …in cor respondence with Abel's "wife., (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November…
  • p. 204 …in .the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 237 …In reality, however, the United States would maintain strict control over the missions to be flown…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
  • p. 348 …System-I used S- and X-band ELINT receivers to collect ground-controlled intercept and air…
  • p. 400 387 Sec1 et NOFORN mission 2023 108 mission 2029 124 mission 3086 200 mission 3088 200…
177
See, et NOFORN
Chapter 4
area. The plane began spiraling down toward the ground and Powers
looked for a way out. Unable to use the ejection seat because centrifu
gal force had thrown him against the canopy, he released the canopy
and prepared to bail out, waiting to arm the destruction device at the
last minute, so that it would not go off while he was still in the plane.
When he released his seatbelt, however, he was immediately sucked
out of the aircraft and found himself dangling by his oxygen hose, un
able to reach the destruction switches. Finally, the hose broke and he
tlew away from the falling aircraft. After he fell several thousand
feet, his parachute opened automatically, and he drifted to earth where
he was quickly surrounded by farmers and then by Soviet officials.29
His aircraft had not been destroyed by the crash, and the Soviets were
able to identify much of its equipment when they put it on display 10
days later. Even if Powers had been able to activate the destruction
device, however, it would not have destroyed the aircraft. The small
explosive charge was only designed to wreck the camera.
How had the Soviets succeeded in downing the U-2? Although
some CIA project officials initially wondered if Powers had been fly
i_ng too low through an error or mechanical malfunction, he main
tained that he had been flying at his assigned altitude and had been
brought down by a near miss of a Soviet surface-to-air missile. This
turned out to be the case, for in March 1963, the US air attache in
Moscow learned that the Sverdlovsk SA-2 battery had fired a
three-missile salvo that, in addition to disabling Powers' plane, also
scored a direct hit on a Soviet fighter aircraft sent aloft to intercept
the U-2.'0 Mission planners had not known about this SAM site be
fore the mission because they always laid out flight plans to avoid
known SAM sites.
THE AFTERMATH OF THE U-2 DOWNING
The first indication that something was wrong with Powers' m1ss1on
came even before he was overdue at Bodo, Norway. The CIA
Operations Center learned on l May at 0330 hours Washington time
'' Powers, Operation Overjliglzt. pp. 82-84; Beschloss. Mayday, pp. 26-28: Transcript of
Debriefing Tapes of Francis Gary Powers, 13 February 1962. Board of Inquiry on the
Conduct of Francis Gary Powers, Operations MUDLARK tiles, OSA records. job
74-8-605, box 6 (S).
"' Cunningham interview, 4 October 1983 (TS Codeword); OSA History, chap. 14, p. 55
(TS Codeword).
&eeret

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.