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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …following day, when the next U-2 mission f m the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 ( 18 March 1957), OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 7…
  • p. 142 …where they would not interfere with the control surfaces. At the ends of these poles, completely…
  • p. 147 …To take ad vantage of these weaknesses, Detachment C staged three missions from Alaska into the…
  • p. 156 …After these missions, penetrat ion overflights became a rarity. There would be only six more during…
  • p. 167 …U-2 missions. To handle U-2 material, the British created a new control system, which…
  • p. 168 …The British missions would be operationally controlled by CIA project headquarters. Soon afterward four British pilots…
  • p. 169 …where the United Kingdom carried out 27 missions during the two years its pi lots took…
  • p. 170 157 Sec, et MOF'ORI\I Chapter 3 May 1959, and used to fly weather missions…
  • p. 180 …The excellent photography from tnis mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts diid…
  • p. 188 …some Soviet airborne-missile fire-control systems. Operation GRAND SLAM, mission 4154 and the 24th deep…
  • p. 191 …key project personnel assembled in the Agency control center that morning (with the exception of Bissell…
  • p. 196 …in cor respondence with Abel's "wife., (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November…
  • p. 204 …in .the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 237 …In reality, however, the United States would maintain strict control over the missions to be flown…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
  • p. 348 …System-I used S- and X-band ELINT receivers to collect ground-controlled intercept and air…
  • p. 400 387 Sec1 et NOFORN mission 2023 108 mission 2029 124 mission 3086 200 mission 3088 200…
174
Sec, el NOFOAN
Chapter 4
of Soviet ICBM sites. The other proposed overflight, Operation TIME
STEP out of Greenland, was more likely to run into bad weather
(which would affect both navigation and photography) because the
flightpath would remain above 60° north latitude during the entire
mission. Furthermore, mission planners opposed this route because of
its greater risk. In his letter to Richard Bis sell on 14 March 1960,
Colonel Burke stated:
Operation "TIME STEP" is our last choice because we can as
sume, with a 90 percent probability of being correct, that we will
be detected on entr_,; tracked accurately throughout the period in
denied territory (approximately four hours), and will evoke a
strong PVO [Soviet Air Defense} reaction. This flight plan would
permit alerting of SAM sites, and pre-positioning of missile
equipped fighters in the Murmansk area (point of exit) thus
enhancing the possibility of successful intercept. In addition, we
must assume that even were the Soviets unable to physically in
terfere with such an incursion, sufficient evidence will be avail
able to permit them to document a diplomatic protest should they
desire to do so. 15
The concerns raised by Colonel Burke about TIME STEP should
also have been raised about Operation GRAND SLAM, which would
be the most adventuresome overflight to date because it proposed
covering so much of the Soviet Union. If the Soviets could track the
U-2 early in the mission, they would have plenty of time to prepare to
intercept the aircraft.
The pilot selected for Operation GRAND SLAM was Francis
Gary Powers, the most experienced U-2 pilot in the program. Powers
had joined the project in May 1956 and had flown 27 operational mis
sions in the U-2. including one each over the Soviet Union and China
as well as six along the Soviet border.
To prevent the U-2 from being seen at Peshawar, project manag
ers decided to ferry the aircraft from Adana to Pakistan the night be
fore the scheduled flight. Once the plane was refueled and its camera
was loaded, it would take off at daybreak, with little if any exposure
to local residents because of darkness and its short stay-less than six
" Memorandum for Richard M. Bissell. Deputy Director (Plans). from Col. William
Burke. Acting Chic:f. DPD, "Evaluation of Proposed CHALICE Operations," 14 March
1960, IC Staff, COMIREX records, job 33-T-123A. box 10, "CHALICE (General)" (TS
Codeword).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.