Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 11 …At great risk, US Air Force and Navy aircraft had been conducting peripheral reconnaissance and shallow…
  • p. 16 …As a result, in the late 1940s, the US Air Force and Navy began trying to…
  • p. 17 …Two months later, on 7 October 1952, Soviet fighter aircraft stalked and shot down a US…
  • p. 72 …The terminology used to describe U-2 aircraft and pilots also played a part in maintaining…
  • p. 94 …The committee issued its l ist of cargets for the use of the entire intelli gence…
  • p. 147 …The Agency then turned co the Navy, which granted permission for Detachmernt C to use the…
  • p. 180 …James Doolittle urged President Eisenhower to use overflights of the Soviet Union to the maximum degree…
  • p. 223 …by Air Force and Navy reconnais sance aircraft. President Kennedy used NPIC photographs to i llustrate…
  • p. 273 …Charyk, and his Navy counterpart, Garrison Norton. Designers from several air craft manufacturers also attended some…
  • p. 283 …This engine had originally been developed for the Navy's large, jet-powered flying boat, the…
  • p. 297 …The need for additional bui ldings on the base was met by the Navy. Three surplus…
  • p. 298 …After hearing Bissell and Holcomb's suggestion that the 158 might be used in future Navy…
  • p. 348 …Following modifications to make System-VII suitable for use by the Navy, the designation was changed…
  • p. 353 …In 1968 tests on an AQUILINE prototype at Randsburg Wash on the US Navy's Naval…
  • p. 401 …247, 328 US Marine Corps Reserve 14 US Military Academy at West Point 329 US Navy…
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Chapter 4
deployed SS-6 site because it could provide exemplars for
photointerpreters to use in searching subsequent overhead photogra
phy for similar installations.13
The two proposed overflights that would cover the northern rail
road lines received the strongest consideration. Both plans contained
new features. Operation TIME STEP called for a U-2 to take off from
the USAF base at Thule, Greenland, which would be the first over
flight staged from this base. The aircraft would then fly over Novaya
Zemlya on its way to cover the railroad lines from the Polyamyy Ural
Mountains to Kotlas. The return flight would be over Murmansk with
the landing to take place at either Bodo or Andoya on Norway's
northeast coast. The other proposed overflight, Operation GRAND
SLAM, was the first U-2 mission planned to transit the Soviet Union;
all previous missions had penetrated not more than halfway and then
left in the general direction from which they came. GRAND SLAM
proposed to fly across the Soviet Union from south to north, departing
from Peshawar, Pakistan, and landing at Bodo, Norway. The mission
would overfly Tyuratam, Sverdlovsk, Kirov, Kotlas, Severodvinsk,
and Murmansk.
The two preferred missions both required the use of the airfield
at Bodo, which had been authorized by senior Norwegian intelligence
and military officers. Because the Bodo airfield was involved in
NATO maneuvers taking place in the Barents Sea area, Bissell in
formed the White House that neither mission could be flown before
19 April. Once the maneuvers ended, bad weather over the Soviet
Union kept the mission from taking place when it was originally
scheduled. Richard Bissell, therefore, asked President Eisenhower for
more time. and, on 25 April, General Goodpaster relayed the
President's instructions to Bissell that "one additional operation may
be undertaken, provided it is carried out prior to May 1. No operation
is to be carried out after May l. " 14 The President did not want to fly
missions any later than that because the Paris Summit was scheduled
to begin on 16 May 1960.
By this time, CIA planners were concentrating on Operation
GRAND SLAM as the most likely route for the proposed mission be
cause it offered the best chance of photographing suspected locations
'·' OSA Hi.1·tory, chap. 12. pp. 35-36 (TS Codeword).
" Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President, p. 569; Beschloss, Mayday, p. 10.
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.