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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

Open the PDF at page 183 Original source ↗

“The Advance”34 pages

  • p. 6 …255 The Phaseout of the Office of Special Activities ........ ................... 257 0 ) Chapter 6 The U-2…
  • p. 7 …319 Advances in Technology............................................... ........................... 320 Cooperation With the Air Force ............................................................. 321 Impact of the Overhead Reconnaissance…
  • p. 22 …retired from the Air Force to become the assistant director of Lockheed's Advanced Development Program…
  • p. 24 11 / Chapter 1 gravity (g's) instead of the military specification strengLh of 5.33 g…
  • p. 32 …lithium deuteride, a tech nology more advanced than the heavy water method used by US '' BEACON…
  • p. 33 …between the developed and undeveloped nations. This aggressive Soviet foreign policy. combined with advances in nuclear…
  • p. 58 …secrecy in the new project, Kelly Johnson placed it in Lockheed's Advanced Development facility at…
  • p. 65 …His software algorithms made it possible to model lens designs and determine in advance the effects…
  • p. 76 …seen on pilot Francis Gary Powers) advanced gear for the U-2 pilots. David Clark expert…
  • p. 111 …of Soviet advances in long-range bombers and missiles. The initial sighting of the new Soviet…
  • p. 114 …Adenauer be informed in advance of US plans to overfly the Soviet Union from bases in…
  • p. 174 …concentrating on developing the more advanced solid-fueled missiles rather than increasing the num ber of…
  • p. 183 …if the Soviet SAMs received sufficient advanced warning, they posed a major threat to the U…
  • p. 191 …the cover story that had been prepared and distributed in advance of the mission. The first…
  • p. 206 …In 1965 the head of OSA received a new title, Director of Special Activities. The Office…
  • p. 235 …STPOLLY added the more advanced Lockheed P3A in 1963. Between 1955 and 1967, when the CIA…
  • p. 249 …The Defense Department feared that the loss of this device with its highly advanced traveling-wave…
  • p. 250 …Chapter 5 Advanced ECM Equipment for Detachment H Demand for overhead photography of the PRC continued…
  • p. 252 …In addition, the Project TACKLE U-2s began receiving even more advanced ECM • 60 equipment. •• Mission…
  • p. 265 …but some was the result of technological advances. The ini tial order for eight of the…
  • p. 266 …This camera was actually a very advanced version of the original B camera with a new…
  • p. 282 …aircraft from the small inventory of its most advanced bomber. Even had the B-588 program…
  • p. 295 …In fact, it was an advanced version of the highly reliable B camera developed for the…
  • p. 296 …Prospective pilots had to be qualified in the most advanced fighters and be emotionally stable and…
  • p. 307 …advanced experimental jet aircraft, the A-11. which has been tested in sustained flight at more…
  • p. 310 …It was now time to find work for the most advanced aircraft ever conceived and built…
  • p. 321 …advanced aircraft ever .built was to be put out to pasture. The aban donment of the…
  • p. 325 …when the OXCART program ended in the summer of 1968, no mcire advanced successor was wait…
  • p. 326 …The most advanced aircraft of the 20th century had become an anachronism before it was ever…
  • p. 333 …ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY One very important byproduct of the CIA's manned reconnaissance program was the…
  • p. 334 …the end of the usefulness of the world's most advanced aircraft; its offspring, the SR…
  • p. 335 …Thus, the CIA sponsored the development of the world's most advanced aircraft-the OXCART-and…
  • p. 352 …They believed that recent advances in the minia turization of electronic technology would make possible the…
  • p. 356 343 Defense Research and Engineering, John Foster, liked the concept and provided DOD funding for ORD…
170
~eeFet J.\IOFOAN
Chapter 4
One of the reasons why Operation SQUARE DEAL had been se
lected for the 9 April flight was that mission planners believed that
penetration from the Pakistan/Afghanistan area offered the greatest
chance of escaping detection by the Soviet air defense system.
Colonel Burke's 14 March letter recommending SQUARE DEAL as
the preferred route for the next overflight had stated, "There is a rea
sonable chance of completing this operation without detection."
Escaping detection had become important because, if the Soviet
SAMs received sufficient advanced warning, they posed a major
threat to the U-2.
CIA hopes that flights from Pakistan or Afghanistan might go
undetected proved false. On the 9 April overflight, the U-2 's
ELINT-collection unit (System VI) indicated Soviet tracking at a very
early stage of the mission. Although the Soviets failed to intercept the
U-2, their success at tracking it should have served as a warning
against future overflights from Pakistan (or anywhere else, for that
matter). On 26 April 1960, Colonel Burke informed Richard Bissell
that "experience gained as a result of Operation SQUARE DEAL
indicates that penetration without detection from the Pakistan/
Afghanistan area may not be as easy in the future as heretofor." 11
Unfortunately, neither Colonel Burke nor Richard Bissell took the
logical step of recommending the cessation of overflights now that
the risks had increased substantially. The lure of the prospective intel
ligence gain from each mission was too strong, and the Soviets' lack
of success at interception to date had probably made the project staff
overconfident. Furthermore, both DCI Allen Dulles and the
President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
were pressing for more photos of the Soviet Union in order to settle
the missile-gap debate raging in the intelligence community and
Congress.
THE LAST OVERFLIGHT: OPERATION GRAND SLAM
Even before the 9 April overflight took place, President Eisenhower
had consented on 28 March to an additional overflight during the
month of April. His willingness to allow yet another overflight was
" Memorandum for Richard M. Bissell, Deputy Director (Plans), from Colonel Burke,
Acting Chief, DPD. "Operational Priority of Proposed CHALICE Missions," 26 April
1960, IC Staff, COMIREX records.job 33-T-123A, box 10. "CHALICE (General)" (TS
Codeword).
Secaet

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.