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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …following day, when the next U-2 mission f m the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 ( 18 March 1957), OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 7…
  • p. 142 …where they would not interfere with the control surfaces. At the ends of these poles, completely…
  • p. 147 …To take ad vantage of these weaknesses, Detachment C staged three missions from Alaska into the…
  • p. 156 …After these missions, penetrat ion overflights became a rarity. There would be only six more during…
  • p. 167 …U-2 missions. To handle U-2 material, the British created a new control system, which…
  • p. 168 …The British missions would be operationally controlled by CIA project headquarters. Soon afterward four British pilots…
  • p. 169 …where the United Kingdom carried out 27 missions during the two years its pi lots took…
  • p. 170 157 Sec, et MOF'ORI\I Chapter 3 May 1959, and used to fly weather missions…
  • p. 180 …The excellent photography from tnis mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts diid…
  • p. 188 …some Soviet airborne-missile fire-control systems. Operation GRAND SLAM, mission 4154 and the 24th deep…
  • p. 191 …key project personnel assembled in the Agency control center that morning (with the exception of Bissell…
  • p. 196 …in cor respondence with Abel's "wife., (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November…
  • p. 204 …in .the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 237 …In reality, however, the United States would maintain strict control over the missions to be flown…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
  • p. 348 …System-I used S- and X-band ELINT receivers to collect ground-controlled intercept and air…
  • p. 400 387 Sec1 et NOFORN mission 2023 108 mission 2029 124 mission 3086 200 mission 3088 200…
168
Sec, et N6f6IU4
Chapter 4
In authorizing another overflight of the Soviet Union, President
Eisenhower directed that it be conducted before 30 March. Because of
complications in getting permission from Pakistan to use the airfield
at Peshawar, however, the mission could not be staged in March, and
the President agreed to extend his dleadline until l 0 April 1960. One
day before the expiration of this cle.adline, a U-2 equipped with a
B-camera took off from Peshawar on the last successful overflight of
the Soviet Union, Operation SQUARE DEAL. As had been the case
during the previous two overflights, a second U-2 flew a diversionary
mission along the Soviet-Iranian border. After leaving Peshawar, mis
sion 4155 headed first for Saryshagan, where it obtained the first pic
tures of two new Soviet radars, the HEN HOUSE and HEN ROOST
installations. The U-2 then flew to the nuclear testing site at
Semipalatinsk. Returning to the Saryshagan area, it crisscrossed the
railroad network there and then proceeded to Tyuratam. where it pho
tographed a new two-pad, road-served launch area that suggested a
new Soviet missile was in the offing.18
In his memoirs Nikita Khrushchev remarked that this U-2 should
have been shot down. "but our antiaircraft batteries were caught nap
ping and didn ' t open fire soon enough." Khrushchev explained that
Soviet missile designers had developed a high-altitude antiaircraft
missile and batteries of this missile had been deployed near known
targets of the U-2.19
The CIA already had strong indications of improvements in the
Soviet air defense system, and early in 1960 the Development
Projects Division had asked Air force experts at the Air Technical
Intelligence Center (ATIC) for a frank assessment of Soviet capabili
ties against the U-2. On 14 March ll960, Col. William Burke, acting
chief of the DPD, relayed the ATIC assessment to Richard Bissell:
The sreatest threat to the U-2 is the Soviet SAM. Although the
AT!C analysis concedes a remote possibility thac the SAM may
be less effective than estimatea~ their present evaluation is that
the SAM (Guideline) has a high probability of successful inter
cept at 70,000 feet providing th.at detection is made in sufficient
time lO alert the site. 10
,. Mission folder 4155. 9 April 1960. OSA records. job 67-8 -328. box 6 (TS Codeword).
•• Nikita S. Khrushchev. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament (Boston: Little.
Brown. & Co.. 1974). pp. 443-444.
"' Memorandum for Richard M. Bissell. Deputy· Director (Plans). from Col. William Burke.
Acting Chief, DPD ...Evaluation of Proposed CHALICE Operations:· 14 March 1960, IC
Staff, COMIREX records.job 33-T-123A. box I0 . ..CHALICE (General).. (TS Codeword).

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.