Documents / Official release
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
“Nevers”34 pages
i 167 President"s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities. At a meeting of the board on 2 February 1960, Gen. James Doolittle urged President Eisenhower to use overflights of the Soviet Union to the maximum degree possible. The President's response, as summarized in General Goodpaster's notes of the meeting, showed that the upcoming summit meeting was already an important factor in his attitude toward U-2 flights: "The President said that he has one tremendous asset in a summit meeting, as regards effect in the free world. That is his reputation for honesty. If one of these aircraft were lost when we are engaged in apparently sincere deliberations, it could be put on display in Moscow and ruin the President's effectiveness." 15 A few days later, another U-2 took to the sky on a mission over the Soviet Union. As in December, the pilot was British, and the mis sion had been ordered by Prime Minister Macmillan. On 5 Felbruary 1960, a Detachment B U-2C with squadron leader John MacAnthur at the controls left Peshawar, Pakistan, to conduct Operation KNIFE EDGE. The plane overflew the Tyuratarn Missile Test Range, headed northwest to Kazan', and then turned south, photographing long stretches of the Soviet rail network. The excellent photography from tnis mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts diid dis cover a new Soviet bomber. dubbed the BACKFIN, at Kazan'. 16 Despite the outcome of this mission, the missile-gap debate con tinued. The Air Force still insisted that the Soviets had deployed as many as 100 missiles . The Army, Navy, and C IA, however, doubted that any had been deployed, because none could be found . Add itional U-2 photography was needed to settle the debate. In mid-February, President Eisenhower reviewed plans for four additional U-2 mis sions. The success of the two British missions, along with the absence of Soviet protests, made the President more willing to consideir a re sumption of US overflights, and he agreed to allow one missiorn to be flown during the month of March. The President's continued riestric tions upon the use of the U-2 disturbed DCI Dulles, who sent a memo randum to the National Security Council on I March 1960 ass,erting that the cardinal objective of obtaining information on Soviet missile deployment could be better achieved if the U-2 were given freer rein." '' Ambrose. Eisenhower: The President. p. 568; Beschloss. Mayday, p. 233. " Mission folder 8009 (5 February 1960). OSA records. job 67-8-972, box 13 (TS Codeword): OSA Chronology. p. 25 (TS Codeword). " OSA Chronolog_v. p. 25 (TS Codeword): Philip K. Edwards. "The President's Board: 1956-60." Studies in Intelligence 13 (Summer 1969):l 18 (S). Chapter 4 5eeret
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.