“Lockheed”60+ pages
- p. 4 …8
Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA. ........................................ 13
Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance ............................................... 17
The BEACON…
- p. 6 …260
Competition Between Lockheed and Convair ...................................... 267
The Selection of the Lockheed Design .............. ... ................ ................ 270
Efforts To…
- p. 12 …excellent technical study of the U-2: Lockheed U-2
(l 983).
There has also been…
- p. 22 …Immediately after returning to California, Carter proposed to
Lockheed Vice President L. Eugene Root (previously the…
- p. 23 10
Secret ld0F8RN
Chapter 1
Lockheed also submit a design. Carter noted that the proposed aircraft…
- p. 24 …who then asked Lockheed to Kelly Johnson
. sμbmit a specific proposal. In early April, Kelly Johnson…
- p. 25 .
12
Sec,et NOFORN
Chapter 1
The Lockheed CL-282 Development Planning. According to Wienberg, General…
- p. 26 …Despite the Air Force's selection
of the X-16, Lockheed continued to work on the…
- p. 27 …Proposals for special reconnaissance aircraft have been re
ceived in the Air Staff from Lockheed. Fairchild…
- p. 28 …range are not as good as the
Lockheed CL-282. :;
Gardner's enthusiasm for the CL…
- p. 29 …Few detaiils about Dulles's precise attitude
toward the proposed Lockheed reconnaissance aircraft are available,
but…
- p. 37 …for Philip Strong of the CIA had told him that the
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation had designed…
- p. 39 …Thus, even though
the Lockheed CL-282 had several important sources of support by
September I954…
- p. 40 …Council.'A
Project Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282
Chapter 1
James R. Killian, Jr…
- p. 42 …Agency.~·1
Land learned the details of Lockheed's proposed CL-282 aircraft
soon after he…
- p. 43 30
Sec, et NOFORM
Chapter 1
briefly mention a Lockheed design for a high-flying aircraft…
- p. 44 …During September and October the Project Three study group
met frequently to discuss the Lockheed design…
- p. 47 …The Lockheed super glider will fly at 70,000 feet, well out of the
reach of…
- p. 48 …Putt, to oppose the adoption of the Lockheed design. The officials ar
gued that the Bell…
- p. 49 …He used Gardner's
statement to convince Lockheed's senior management to approve the
project, which…
- p. 50 …small group of prominent scientists that the
Lockheed design represented the best possible overhead reconnais-
sance…
- p. 52 …afternoon of 3 Decembeli, they
' Although the Lockheed CL-282 was not designated as the U…
- p. 53 …r the airframes to be built by Lockheed. His query was
greeted with silence. Everyone present…
- p. 55 …This category in
cluded maintenance and support personnel from Lockheed (five per
aircraft), the pilots, and…
- p. 56 …to be
settled, including the contract with Lockheed. Nevertheless. work on
the U-2 began as…
- p. 57 …A general contractor such as Lockheed
can purchase much, if not all, of the supplies needed…
- p. 58 …During the final contract negotiations in the spring
of 1958, Lockheed and the US Government agreed…
- p. 59 …Aircraft," 9 Dc:cc:mbc:r 195-i.
Lockheed Contract Filc:s. OSA Records (S ).
SeeFet
- p. 61 …F. Boc:hrne. Summary Report:
Reconnaissance Aircraft. Lockheed Aircraft Corpor.ition Report I04'.!0. 28 January…
- p. 63 …1954, even before the CIA adopted
the Lockheed proposal. Baker quickly recognized, however, that he
would…
- p. 69 …1-2 (TS Codeword); Miller, Lockheed U-2. pp. 19-20.
Sea,at
- p. 70 …By July 1955 the base
was ready, and Agency, Air Force, and Lockheed personnel began
moving…
- p. 74 61
project-the construction and testing of the aircraft-remained the ex
clusive province of Lockheed…
- p. 77 …The first model of the
pressure suit, used by Lockheed test pilots, made no provision for…
- p. 79 …Geary told Culbertson that the Lockheed
CL-282 was going to be known officially as the…
- p. 81 …former director of Lockheed's Skunk Works.
10 Donald E. Welzenbach, 14 March 1986 (U): Miller…
- p. 84 …7 (TS Codeword); Miller, Lockheed U-2, p. 22.
"' OSA Hiswry, chap. 8, pp. 12-14…
- p. 85 …how to transfer Lockheed employees
from Burbank to Area 5 l without arousing a great deal…
- p. 88 …Colonel Yancey was in charge of six SAC pilots who were to be
trained by Lockheed…
- p. 90 …CIA, which then placed an order with
Lockheed for 29 U-2s in configurations to be…
- p. 107 …U-2
cover story stating that a Lockheed-developed aircraft would be flown
by the USAF…
- p. 143 …Lockheed mechanics
had mounted the various RAINBOW devices on the prototype U-2, a
Lockheed test…
- p. 144 …Unable to restart the power plant, Lockheed tesi: pilot
Robert Sieker bailed out but was struck…
- p. 145 …The loss of one of Lockheed's best test pilots. as well as the pro
totype…
- p. 157 …As a substitute,
Lockheed began working to develop a paint with radar-suppressant
qualities, but this…
- p. 162 …After a series of tests over Edwards AFB, Lockheed began coating
the U-2s with a…
- p. 188 …Although it had been refurbished by
Lockheed and now had the more powerful 175 engine that…
- p. 199 …In the meantime Pow1ers began working for Lockheed
as a U-2 pilot. In March 1963…
- p. 200 …Beschloss claims that Powers was tired by Lockheed
for criticizing the Agency in his memoirs (which…
- p. 209 …2
One week later Colonel Geary called to order Lockheed to up
grade six older U…
- p. 211 …In May 1961, Lockheed began modifying Agency U-2s so that
they could be refueled in…
- p. 220 …story, which
was that its pilots were Lockheed employees on a ferry flight to
Puerto Rico…
- p. 230 …for Detachment C
Late in l 958, Lockheed began refitting the Agency's 13 remaining
U…
- p. 235 …STPOLLY
added the more advanced Lockheed P3A in 1963. Between 1955 and
1967, when the CIA…
- p. 236 …U-2 missions, and the Air Force, which had
Lockheed P-2V7 and P3A
reconnaissance aircraft
- p. 238 …The planes were maintained by Lockheed mechanics under con
tract to the CIA. The Agency attempted…
- p. 255 …All Air Force and CIA U-2s were or
dered back to Lockheed for ultrasonic inspection…
- p. 260 …The Agency dispatched several pilots to Taiwan under the cover
of Lockheed employees working on a…
- p. 264 …G in California-with three more at Lockheed undergo
ing repair. The Agency had originally ordered…
- p. 265 …Francis Gary Powers was one of the Lockheed test pilots who
checked out this new aircraft…
i
167
President"s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities.
At a meeting of the board on 2 February 1960, Gen. James Doolittle
urged President Eisenhower to use overflights of the Soviet Union to
the maximum degree possible. The President's response, as
summarized in General Goodpaster's notes of the meeting, showed
that the upcoming summit meeting was already an important factor in
his attitude toward U-2 flights: "The President said that he has one
tremendous asset in a summit meeting, as regards effect in the free
world. That is his reputation for honesty. If one of these aircraft were
lost when we are engaged in apparently sincere deliberations, it could
be put on display in Moscow and ruin the President's effectiveness." 15
A few days later, another U-2 took to the sky on a mission over
the Soviet Union. As in December, the pilot was British, and the mis
sion had been ordered by Prime Minister Macmillan. On 5 Felbruary
1960, a Detachment B U-2C with squadron leader John MacAnthur at
the controls left Peshawar, Pakistan, to conduct Operation KNIFE
EDGE. The plane overflew the Tyuratarn Missile Test Range, headed
northwest to Kazan', and then turned south, photographing long
stretches of the Soviet rail network. The excellent photography from
tnis mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts diid dis
cover a new Soviet bomber. dubbed the BACKFIN, at Kazan'. 16
Despite the outcome of this mission, the missile-gap debate con
tinued. The Air Force still insisted that the Soviets had deployed as
many as 100 missiles . The Army, Navy, and C IA, however, doubted
that any had been deployed, because none could be found . Add itional
U-2 photography was needed to settle the debate. In mid-February,
President Eisenhower reviewed plans for four additional U-2 mis
sions. The success of the two British missions, along with the absence
of Soviet protests, made the President more willing to consideir a re
sumption of US overflights, and he agreed to allow one missiorn to be
flown during the month of March. The President's continued riestric
tions upon the use of the U-2 disturbed DCI Dulles, who sent a memo
randum to the National Security Council on I March 1960 ass,erting
that the cardinal objective of obtaining information on Soviet missile
deployment could be better achieved if the U-2 were given freer rein."
'' Ambrose. Eisenhower: The President. p. 568; Beschloss. Mayday, p. 233.
" Mission folder 8009 (5 February 1960). OSA records. job 67-8-972, box 13 (TS
Codeword): OSA Chronology. p. 25 (TS Codeword).
" OSA Chronolog_v. p. 25 (TS Codeword): Philip K. Edwards. "The President's Board:
1956-60." Studies in Intelligence 13 (Summer 1969):l 18 (S).
Chapter 4
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