Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 123 …Former Air Force Col. Richard S. Leghorn headed the SEI operation for the Agency when it…
  • p. 146 …U-2 took off from Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska to conduct the first intentional…
  • p. 195 …were consolidated into Detachment G at Edwards Air Force Base, California. the unit formed after the…
  • p. 222 …CIA's U-2 Detachment at Edwards Air Force Base on 11 October, and the CIA…
  • p. 234 …were incorporated into Detachment G at Edwards Air Force Base in California. This detachment was now…
  • p. 269 …s Detachment G at Edwards Air Force Base could deploy air- craft to~-------------' and begin ti…
  • p. 308 295 Sect et NOFORN Chapter 6 these aircraft were hastily flown to Edwards Air Force Base…
165
Sec. et NOFORl'J
Chapter 4
- J .
•. ~ ·~-:.. -?.,-
.._.,.,,..__,_~ -
- .
-~1}').'~F '<
....;
Staff Nathan Twining each gave different figures for the number of
deployed Soviet missiles. Although the CIA figures were based on
evidence gained from overflights, Dulles could not reveal this fact to
the Senate and, therefore, faced very sharp questioning. 14
As a result of these Senate hearings, Dulles was determinced to
obtain permission for more overflights in order to settle the mis
sile-gap question once and for all and end the debate within the intelli
gence community. To accomplish this, Dulles proposed photographing
the most likely areas for the deployment of Soviet missiles. Alt this
time there was still no evidence of SS-6 ICBM deployment outside the
Tyuratam missile test range. Because the SS-6 was e:<tremely large
and liquid fueled, analysts believed these missiles could only bie de
ployed near railroads. Existing U-2 photography showed rai!lroad
tracks going right to the launching pad at the test site. Dulles. tlhere
fore argued that SS-6 installations could easily be located by flying
along railroad lines. Dulles was supported by members of the
" Licklider. " Missile Gap Controversy." pp. 608-609.
. •
-r.- -·
~
·
Saratov Engels Airfield,
6 December 1959

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.