Documents / Official release
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
“Tibet”7 pages
163 to gather intelligence on the Soviet missile program. Discussions con tinued the following day with the addition of Secretary of State Herter, who stated in support of the CIA proposal that "the intelli gence objective outweighs the danger of getting trapped." The strong backing of the proposed overflight by both CIA and the State Department finally convinced President Eisenhower to approve the • • 9 mIss10n. On 9 July 1959, more than 16 months after the previous over flight of the Soviet Union, a U -2 equipped with a B camera left Peshawar, Pakistan, flew over the Urals, and then crossed the missile test range at Tyuratam. This mission, known as Operation TOUCHDOWN, produced excellent results. Its photography revealed that the Soviets were expanding the launch facilities at Tyuratam. Whi le this overflight was under way, another U-2 flew a diversionary mission along the Soviet-Iranian border.'0 Despite its success, this overflight remained an isolated incident. President Eisenhower was unwilling to authorize additional over- • flights of I.he Soviet Union. in part because he did not wish to increase tension before Premier Khrushchev's visit to the United States sched uled for 15-27 September 1959. Nevertheless, the President still wanted as much intelligence on the Soviet missile program as possi ble. Because the Soviets were conducting an extensive program of missile tests in mid- I 959, Eisenhower authorized a steady stream of I.he less provocative electronic intelligence (ELINT)-gathering mis sions (14 in all) along the Soviet border during the remainder of the II year. Within the United States, concern about the Soviet missile pro gram continued to grow. On 12 September 1959 the Soviets scored another space success when their Luna 2 rocket reached the moon, and Khrushchev stressed this success when he arrived in the United States three days later. He also boasted of Soviet missile progress in private conversations with President Eisenhower. while making no • Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum for the Record. 7 July 1959 (TS): iJem, Memorandum of Conference with the President. 8 July !959. WHOSS. Alpha. DDEL (TS). "' Mission folder 4 115 (9 July 1959). OSA records (TS Codeword). " OSA Hisrorv. chap. 19. annex 120. pp. 12- 14 (TS Codeword). ~etNOFORPJ Chapter 4 iiee,et
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.