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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

Open the PDF at page 176 Original source ↗

“The Advance”34 pages

  • p. 6 …255 The Phaseout of the Office of Special Activities ........ ................... 257 0 ) Chapter 6 The U-2…
  • p. 7 …319 Advances in Technology............................................... ........................... 320 Cooperation With the Air Force ............................................................. 321 Impact of the Overhead Reconnaissance…
  • p. 22 …retired from the Air Force to become the assistant director of Lockheed's Advanced Development Program…
  • p. 24 11 / Chapter 1 gravity (g's) instead of the military specification strengLh of 5.33 g…
  • p. 32 …lithium deuteride, a tech nology more advanced than the heavy water method used by US '' BEACON…
  • p. 33 …between the developed and undeveloped nations. This aggressive Soviet foreign policy. combined with advances in nuclear…
  • p. 58 …secrecy in the new project, Kelly Johnson placed it in Lockheed's Advanced Development facility at…
  • p. 65 …His software algorithms made it possible to model lens designs and determine in advance the effects…
  • p. 76 …seen on pilot Francis Gary Powers) advanced gear for the U-2 pilots. David Clark expert…
  • p. 111 …of Soviet advances in long-range bombers and missiles. The initial sighting of the new Soviet…
  • p. 114 …Adenauer be informed in advance of US plans to overfly the Soviet Union from bases in…
  • p. 174 …concentrating on developing the more advanced solid-fueled missiles rather than increasing the num ber of…
  • p. 183 …if the Soviet SAMs received sufficient advanced warning, they posed a major threat to the U…
  • p. 191 …the cover story that had been prepared and distributed in advance of the mission. The first…
  • p. 206 …In 1965 the head of OSA received a new title, Director of Special Activities. The Office…
  • p. 235 …STPOLLY added the more advanced Lockheed P3A in 1963. Between 1955 and 1967, when the CIA…
  • p. 249 …The Defense Department feared that the loss of this device with its highly advanced traveling-wave…
  • p. 250 …Chapter 5 Advanced ECM Equipment for Detachment H Demand for overhead photography of the PRC continued…
  • p. 252 …In addition, the Project TACKLE U-2s began receiving even more advanced ECM • 60 equipment. •• Mission…
  • p. 265 …but some was the result of technological advances. The ini tial order for eight of the…
  • p. 266 …This camera was actually a very advanced version of the original B camera with a new…
  • p. 282 …aircraft from the small inventory of its most advanced bomber. Even had the B-588 program…
  • p. 295 …In fact, it was an advanced version of the highly reliable B camera developed for the…
  • p. 296 …Prospective pilots had to be qualified in the most advanced fighters and be emotionally stable and…
  • p. 307 …advanced experimental jet aircraft, the A-11. which has been tested in sustained flight at more…
  • p. 310 …It was now time to find work for the most advanced aircraft ever conceived and built…
  • p. 321 …advanced aircraft ever .built was to be put out to pasture. The aban donment of the…
  • p. 325 …when the OXCART program ended in the summer of 1968, no mcire advanced successor was wait…
  • p. 326 …The most advanced aircraft of the 20th century had become an anachronism before it was ever…
  • p. 333 …ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY One very important byproduct of the CIA's manned reconnaissance program was the…
  • p. 334 …the end of the usefulness of the world's most advanced aircraft; its offspring, the SR…
  • p. 335 …Thus, the CIA sponsored the development of the world's most advanced aircraft-the OXCART-and…
  • p. 352 …They believed that recent advances in the minia turization of electronic technology would make possible the…
  • p. 356 343 Defense Research and Engineering, John Foster, liked the concept and provided DOD funding for ORD…
163
to gather intelligence on the Soviet missile program. Discussions con
tinued the following day with the addition of Secretary of State
Herter, who stated in support of the CIA proposal that "the intelli
gence objective outweighs the danger of getting trapped." The strong
backing of the proposed overflight by both CIA and the State
Department finally convinced President Eisenhower to approve the
• • 9
mIss10n.
On 9 July 1959, more than 16 months after the previous over
flight of the Soviet Union, a U -2 equipped with a B camera left
Peshawar, Pakistan, flew over the Urals, and then crossed the missile
test range at Tyuratam. This mission, known as Operation
TOUCHDOWN, produced excellent results. Its photography revealed
that the Soviets were expanding the launch facilities at Tyuratam.
Whi le this overflight was under way, another U-2 flew a diversionary
mission along the Soviet-Iranian border.'0
Despite its success, this overflight remained an isolated incident.
President Eisenhower was unwilling to authorize additional over-
• flights of I.he Soviet Union. in part because he did not wish to increase
tension before Premier Khrushchev's visit to the United States sched
uled for 15-27 September 1959. Nevertheless, the President still
wanted as much intelligence on the Soviet missile program as possi
ble. Because the Soviets were conducting an extensive program of
missile tests in mid- I 959, Eisenhower authorized a steady stream of
I.he less provocative electronic intelligence (ELINT)-gathering mis
sions (14 in all) along the Soviet border during the remainder of the
II
year.
Within the United States, concern about the Soviet missile pro
gram continued to grow. On 12 September 1959 the Soviets scored
another space success when their Luna 2 rocket reached the moon,
and Khrushchev stressed this success when he arrived in the United
States three days later. He also boasted of Soviet missile progress in
private conversations with President Eisenhower. while making no
• Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum for the Record. 7 July 1959 (TS): iJem,
Memorandum of Conference with the President. 8 July !959. WHOSS. Alpha. DDEL
(TS).
"' Mission folder 4 115 (9 July 1959). OSA records (TS Codeword).
" OSA Hisrorv. chap. 19. annex 120. pp. 12- 14 (TS Codeword).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.