Documents / Official release
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
“Nevers”34 pages
162 Sec, et NOfOF'IN Chapter 4 availability of this new equipment." Quarles objected that the satel lites would not be ready for up to two years, but the President replied that this did not matter because the Soviets would not be able to build a first-strike force of ICBMs in the near future. President Eisenhower finally conceded that "one or two flights might possibly be permissi ble," but he ruled out "an extensive program." In light of the "crisis which is impending over Berlin" he did not want to be provocative.6 As the missile-gap controversy raged, President Eisenhower stuck to his refusal to permit overflights of the Soviet Union, al though the Soviet Union's resumption of ICBM testing almost per suaded him to change his mind. On lO April 1959, the President tentatively approved several overflights, but, on the following day, he called in McE!roy and Bissell to inform them that he was withdraw ing his authorization, explaining that "there seems no hope for the fu ture unless we can make some progress in negotiation." Eisenhower remained worried by "the terrible propaganda impact that would be occasioned if a reconnaissance plane were to fail." Although he agreed that new information was necessary, especially in light of the "distortions several senators are making of our military position rela tive to the Soviets," Eisenhower believed that such information would not be worth "the political costs."7 The President remained willing to consider flights that did not overfly Soviet territory, and in June he authorized two electronic in telligence collection missions along the Soviet-Iranian border. The two missions of Operation HOT SHOP took place on 9 and 18 June 1959. The first of these missions was noteworthy because it involved both an Agency U-2 and an Air Force RB-57D Canberra. The two air craft cruised along the Soviet border and made the first telemetry in tercept ever from a Soviet ICBM during first-stage flight, 80 seconds after launch.8 Efforts to persuade the President to authorize penetration mis sions continued. On 7 July 1959, Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell met with Eisenhower to discuss the possibility of a penetration flight • Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for the Record. 12 February 1959, WHOSS Alpha. DDEL (TS); Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President, pp. 513-514; Beschloss, Mayday, p. 173. ' Quoted in Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President, pp. 514-515: Beschloss. Mayday, p.176. • Mission folders 4120 (9 June 1959) and 4121 ( 18 June I 959), OSA records, job 67-8-972, boxes 10 and 11 (TS Codeword). iearet
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.