Documents / Official release
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
“US Navy”15 pages
161 As concern about Soviet missile progress increased, even the in terruption in Soviet ICBM testing was seen as evidence of a Soviet advantage. Although the CIA correctly reasoned that the Soviets were experiencing difficulties in deve lop ing an operational ICB M. the Air Force assumed that the Soviets had halted testing because the missile was ready for deployment.' The controversy intensified early in February 1959, when Secretary o f Defense Neil H. McElroy testified before the Senate Preparedness Investigating Committee on Soviet missile capabilities for the next few years. McElroy told the Senators that in the early 1960s the Soviet Union might have a 3 to I advantage over the United States in operational ICBMs. McElroy stressed that the gap would be temporary and that at its end the Un ited States would enjoy a techno logical advantage because it was concentrating on developing the more advanced solid-fueled missiles rather than increasing the num ber of obsolescent liquid-fue led missiles, but it was his mention of a 3 to l missile gap that made the headlines. Administration critics such as Senator Stuart Symington quickly charged that the actual gap would eventually be even larger.s Faced with rising publ ic and Congressional concern about the missile gap. Defense Department officials pressed President Eisenhower to authorize renewed overflights to gather up-to-date in fonnation about the status of the Soviet missile program. Following a National Security Council meeting on 12 February. Chainnan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Twining. Secretary of Defense McElroy, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles stayed behi nd to talk to the President about overflights. They hoped that the need to refute criti cism of the missile gap fro m Symington and other Democratic Senators would persuade the President to loosen his policy on the use of the U-2. McElroy pointed out that no matter how often Allen Dulles briefed these critics, they would not believe his reassurances about the absence of a missile gap without positive proof such as pho tographs. More overflights would be needed to obtain the kinds of photographs required. The President was not swayed by these arguments. Noting that the reconnaissance satellite project was ··coming along nicely,,. he stated that U-2 flights should be " held to a minimum pending the • Freedman. US Intelligence. p. iO. ' .. What About the Missile Gap'1 .. 1irne. 9 Febru:iry 1959. pp. 11-13. Sec. et NOFORN Chapter 4 Seci:et
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.