Documents / Official release
CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974
Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
“Sea”42 pages
- p. 16 …An RB-29 lost in
the Sea of Japan on 13 June 1952 was probably also…
- p. 38 …off to about 6
percent of its sea-level thrust.
Finally, low structural load factors, like…
- p. 62 …U-2 landing gear and pogos
.Sea,et-
- p. 69 …chap. 8, pp. 1-2 (TS Codeword); Miller, Lockheed U-2. pp. 19-20.
Sea,at
- p. 75 …a boiling point of 300°F at sea level.
Manufacturing this special fuel required petroleum byproducts…
- p. 80 …pounds heavier
and delivered only 10.200 pounds of thrust at sea level; the resulting
Secret
- p. 89 …that they could not be
flown at sea level faster than 190 knots in smooth air…
- p. 98 …Sec.el NOfOftN
Chapter 2
Sea,et
- p. 102 …working on a cover story for over
seas operations. It was important to have a plausible…
- p. 115 North
Sea
First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956
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- p. 116 r/
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--- Mission 2013 4 July
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- p. 120 …Black SEia
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Sec, et NOFORN
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- p. 131 Mission 1316, 1 November 1956
Turkey
Cyprus ',
(U.K .) '·
Mediterranean Sea
lncirlik Airbase
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- p. 139 …Soviet border from the Black Sea to the Caspian
Sea and on to Afghanistan. The System…
- p. 146 …On 31 July,
the same aircraft made a run over the Black Sea. There were a…
- p. 148 …was
the first to photograph the major Soviet space launch facility east of
the Aral Sea…
- p. 153 …of
Soviet naval maneuvers in the Barents Sea. The final overflight of
Detachment A , mission 2040…
- p. 154 …K~ome<e,,
tOO 200Miles
Norwegian
Sea
Barents Sea
Kola
Peninsula
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Sweden f
/ Finlaind…
- p. 155 …Norwegian radars tracked
the overflights of the Barents Sea and Murmansk in October 1957,
and Col…
- p. 157 …well within international airspace above the Black Sea, as
was the case on 27 October I957…
- p. 158 …it turned
abruptly upward over the Bering Sea just west of Alaska, climbed to
110,000…
- p. 166 …the Soviet border and over the Black
Sea without entering Soviet airspace. In late August, as…
- p. 179 Baltic
~a Finland
Black Sea
Tu
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First British Overflight, 6 December…
- p. 185 …Because the Bodo airfield was involved in
NATO maneuvers taking place in the Barents Sea area…
- p. 215 …Caribbean Sea
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Mission 3088 29 August…
- p. 216 …Caribbean Sea
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100 200 Mff.-s
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Multiple missions…
- p. 225 …forces were conducting an all-out air-sea-land drive against
the rebel-held areas in…
- p. 226 f.
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IND/AN OCEAN
300 --
300 IIOOMlloo
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Philippine
Sea
- p. 240 …Philippine
Sea
South China
Sea Philippines •
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- p. 248 …6eeret NOFORN
Chapter 5
Sea,et
- p. 257 …The use of peripheral missions prevented any
further losses, although one aircraft crashed into the sea…
- p. 288 275
Settee NOPORN
Chapter 6
Radar testing of A-72 mockup
Sea,et
- p. 316 …Shortly before Leningrad, the A-12
would head west-southwest down the Baltic Sea, skirting the…
- p. 317 …2 would be flying farther out to
sea, safely beyond the range of all Soviet SAMs…
- p. 350 …B B Afghanistan, Tashkent, Tyuratam,
Kazalinsk, Aral Sea
11 August 1957 4039 McMurray Lahore B B…
- p. 351 …A-2 Dushanbe, Tashkent, Tyuratam,
Kazalinsk, Aral Sea
10 September 1957 4059 Hall Adana B A…
- p. 369 …AQUILINE
304, 339-343
Arabs
256
Aral Sea
135
Arbenz, Jacobo
16
"Archangel-I"
262
"Archangel…
- p. 371 358
&ee,et NQFQRN
Index
Baltic Sea
3, 303
Baltic states
104
Baltimore; Maryland
6, 9…
- p. 373 …186, 201, 205, 208-209, 299, 327
Caspian Sea
126
catheterized
64
cathode-ray tube
267…
- p. 382 …23-24, 109, 139, 143, 164
Kara Sea
142
Kazakh language
135
Kazakhstan
135
Kazan', Soviet…
- p. 385 …301
mechanical fuel totalizer/counters
68
Mediterranean Sea
114, 116. 121, 140, 142, 153
medium-range…
- p. 393 …Pennsylvania
222
Sea of Japan
3
Seaberg, John
8-9. 12. 35-36. 333
SEAFOAM
211…
161
As concern about Soviet missile progress increased, even the in
terruption in Soviet ICBM testing was seen as evidence of a Soviet
advantage. Although the CIA correctly reasoned that the Soviets were
experiencing difficulties in deve lop ing an operational ICB M. the Air
Force assumed that the Soviets had halted testing because the missile
was ready for deployment.'
The controversy intensified early in February 1959, when
Secretary o f Defense Neil H. McElroy testified before the Senate
Preparedness Investigating Committee on Soviet missile capabilities
for the next few years. McElroy told the Senators that in the early
1960s the Soviet Union might have a 3 to I advantage over the United
States in operational ICBMs. McElroy stressed that the gap would be
temporary and that at its end the Un ited States would enjoy a techno
logical advantage because it was concentrating on developing the
more advanced solid-fueled missiles rather than increasing the num
ber of obsolescent liquid-fue led missiles, but it was his mention of a 3
to l missile gap that made the headlines. Administration critics such
as Senator Stuart Symington quickly charged that the actual gap
would eventually be even larger.s
Faced with rising publ ic and Congressional concern about the
missile gap. Defense Department officials pressed President
Eisenhower to authorize renewed overflights to gather up-to-date in
fonnation about the status of the Soviet missile program. Following a
National Security Council meeting on 12 February. Chainnan of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Twining. Secretary of Defense McElroy, and
Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles stayed behi nd to talk to the
President about overflights. They hoped that the need to refute criti
cism of the missile gap fro m Symington and other Democratic
Senators would persuade the President to loosen his policy on the use
of the U-2. McElroy pointed out that no matter how often Allen
Dulles briefed these critics, they would not believe his reassurances
about the absence of a missile gap without positive proof such as pho
tographs. More overflights would be needed to obtain the kinds of
photographs required.
The President was not swayed by these arguments. Noting that
the reconnaissance satellite project was ··coming along nicely,,. he
stated that U-2 flights should be " held to a minimum pending the
• Freedman. US Intelligence. p. iO.
' .. What About the Missile Gap'1 .. 1irne. 9 Febru:iry 1959. pp. 11-13.
Sec. et NOFORN
Chapter 4
Seci:et
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About this file
Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.