Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 143 …Air Force contract to evaluate ra dars, EG&G operated a small testing facility at Indian…
  • p. 244 …Then in August 1964, following the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the Air Force assumed responsibility for…
  • p. 381 …232 Indian Springs, Nevada 274. 130, 132 Indonesia 211-212, 214,319 Indonesian Air Force 212…
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Sec,et N6F6AN
Chapter 4
Launch of Sputnik,
4 October 1957
Premier Nikita Khrushchev asserted that the Soviet Union had an
ICBM capable of carrying a 5-megaton nuclear warhead 8,000 miles.
These statements seemed all the more ominous because, during this
same month of December, the firs:t attempt to launch the new US
Titan ICBM failed. In reality, all of the Soviet statements were sheer
propaganda; they had encountered difficulties with the SS-6 ICBM,
and the program was at a standstill. As a result, there were no ICBM
launches from Tyuratam between 29 May 1958 and 17 February
1959, a space of almost nine months.:
To conceal the difficulties in their missile program. Soviet lead
ers continued to praise its alleged successes. At the beginning of
February 1959, Khrushchev opened the Soviet Communist Party
Congress in Moscow by claiming that "serial production of intercon
tinental ballistic rockets has been organized." Several months later
Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Ma linovsky stated that these missiles
were capable of hitting "precisely ainy point" and added, "Our army
is equipped with a whole series of intercontinental, continental and
other rockets of long, medium and short range." When asked at a
press conference to comment on Malinovsky's statement, President
Eisenhower replied, "They also said that they invented the fly ing ma
chine and the automobile and the tellephone and other things .... Why
should you be so respectful of this statement this morning, if you are
not so respectful of the other three?'" 3 Nevertheless, the Soviet state
ments were taken at face value by most Americans, including many
members of the intelligence community.
' Lawrence Freedman. US lntell(~ttnce and the Soviet Strategic Threat. 2nd. ed.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1936). pp. 69-70.
' Ford Eastman. .. Defense Officials Concede Missile Lag:· Aviation Week, 9 Febru.:lf)'
1959, pp. 26-27.
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.