Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 143 …Air Force contract to evaluate ra dars, EG&G operated a small testing facility at Indian…
  • p. 244 …Then in August 1964, following the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the Air Force assumed responsibility for…
  • p. 381 …232 Indian Springs, Nevada 274. 130, 132 Indonesia 211-212, 214,319 Indonesian Air Force 212…
159
The Final Overflights of
Geern·t NOf'OHN
Chapter 4
_
the Soviet Union,
1959-1960
THE U-2 AND THE "MISSILE-GAP" DEBATE
Despite President Eisenhower's reluctance to send U-2s over the
Soviet Bloc, he once again authorized overflights in the summer of
1959, after a pause of more than a year. The overriding factor in his
decision was the growing '• missile-gap" controversy. which had its
•roots in a series of dramatic Soviet announcements during the second
half of 1957. The first announcement revealed the successful test of
an intercontinental ballistic missile in August. Then in October, the
Soviets announced the successful orbiting of the world's first artificial
earth satellite, Sputnik. One month later the Soviets orbited a second
satellite containing a dog and a television camera. To many
Americans, including some influential members of Congress, the
Soviet Union's space successes seemed to indicate that its missile
program was ahead of that of the United States. By the spring of
1958, after the United States had successfully launched several satel
lites, fears of a space technology gap between the two superpowers
had eased. By the end of the year, however, new concerns arose that
the Soviet Union was producing a missile arsenal that would be much
larger than that of the United States. This was the famous missile gap
that received widespread publicity beginning in early 1959.1
The missile-gap controversy was fueled by Soviet boasts about
the success of their missile program. On 4 December 1958. a Soviet
delegate to the Geneva Conference on Surprise Attack stated: "Soviet
ICBMs are at present in mass production." Five days later, Soviet
' For an overview of tht: controversy. see Roy E. Licklider. "The Missile Gap
Controversy." Political SL'ience Quanerly 85 ( I 970):600-6 l 5.
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.