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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …following day, when the next U-2 mission f m the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 ( 18 March 1957), OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 7…
  • p. 142 …where they would not interfere with the control surfaces. At the ends of these poles, completely…
  • p. 147 …To take ad vantage of these weaknesses, Detachment C staged three missions from Alaska into the…
  • p. 156 …After these missions, penetrat ion overflights became a rarity. There would be only six more during…
  • p. 167 …U-2 missions. To handle U-2 material, the British created a new control system, which…
  • p. 168 …The British missions would be operationally controlled by CIA project headquarters. Soon afterward four British pilots…
  • p. 169 …where the United Kingdom carried out 27 missions during the two years its pi lots took…
  • p. 170 157 Sec, et MOF'ORI\I Chapter 3 May 1959, and used to fly weather missions…
  • p. 180 …The excellent photography from tnis mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts diid…
  • p. 188 …some Soviet airborne-missile fire-control systems. Operation GRAND SLAM, mission 4154 and the 24th deep…
  • p. 191 …key project personnel assembled in the Agency control center that morning (with the exception of Bissell…
  • p. 196 …in cor respondence with Abel's "wife., (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November…
  • p. 204 …in .the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 237 …In reality, however, the United States would maintain strict control over the missions to be flown…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
  • p. 348 …System-I used S- and X-band ELINT receivers to collect ground-controlled intercept and air…
  • p. 400 387 Sec1 et NOFORN mission 2023 108 mission 2029 124 mission 3086 200 mission 3088 200…
157
Sec, et MOF'ORI\I
Chapter 3
May 1959, and used to fly weather missions on 7 and 8 May before
returning to Adana. Two more weather-sampling flights took place
over England on 5 and 6 October 1959.
THE U-2 PROJECT AT THE BEGINNING OF 1959
Early 1959 saw Detachment B aircraft active primarily over Middle
Eastern countries, with occasional overflights of Albania to check for
reported Soviet missile installations. Detachment C mainly collected
high-altitude weather data, although it also flew two missions over
Tibet and Southwest China (see chapter 5). The overflight program
against the Soviet Union seemed to be at a standstill, but pressures
within the government were building to resume deep-penetration
flights to resolve the growing "missile-gap" controversy.
Organizationally, the U-2 project underwent a major change after
Richard Bissell became CIA's Deputy Director for Plans on I January
1959. At first glance, Bissell's selection seems unusual because he
• liad spent most of his Agency career heading the U-2 project, but his
first major assignment had been coordinating support for the opera
tion that overthrew the leftist Government of Guatemala in 1954.
Furthermore, Bissell's U-2 project was the major covert collector 0f
intelligence against the CIA's primary target, the Soviet Union.
During his years as head of the Development Projects Staff
(DPS), Bissell had opposed proposals to bring all Agency air activi
ties together into a single office, fearing that he would lose control of
the U-2 project. Once he became Deputy Director for Plans, his view
point changed; he was now in a position to consolidate all air activi
ties under his own control. On 16 February 1959, the DPS became the
Development Projects Division (DPD) of the Directorate of Plans (at
the time known as the Deputy Directorate/Plans or DDP). Despite the
tremendous increase in the scope of his duties after assuming control
of the DDP, Bissell retained personal control of his previous
Development Projects Staff projects: the U-2 program, another pro
ject to develop a photosatellite, and a third project to design a fol
low-on aircraft for the U-2 (OXCART). Although the amalgamation
of all Agency air operations and the transfer of the U-2 project to the
DDP made sense, the question remained as to whether one individual
could effectively control all these different activities.
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.