Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 11 …At great risk, US Air Force and Navy aircraft had been conducting peripheral reconnaissance and shallow…
  • p. 16 …As a result, in the late 1940s, the US Air Force and Navy began trying to…
  • p. 17 …Two months later, on 7 October 1952, Soviet fighter aircraft stalked and shot down a US…
  • p. 72 …The terminology used to describe U-2 aircraft and pilots also played a part in maintaining…
  • p. 94 …The committee issued its l ist of cargets for the use of the entire intelli gence…
  • p. 147 …The Agency then turned co the Navy, which granted permission for Detachmernt C to use the…
  • p. 180 …James Doolittle urged President Eisenhower to use overflights of the Soviet Union to the maximum degree…
  • p. 223 …by Air Force and Navy reconnais sance aircraft. President Kennedy used NPIC photographs to i llustrate…
  • p. 273 …Charyk, and his Navy counterpart, Garrison Norton. Designers from several air craft manufacturers also attended some…
  • p. 283 …This engine had originally been developed for the Navy's large, jet-powered flying boat, the…
  • p. 297 …The need for additional bui ldings on the base was met by the Navy. Three surplus…
  • p. 298 …After hearing Bissell and Holcomb's suggestion that the 158 might be used in future Navy…
  • p. 348 …Following modifications to make System-VII suitable for use by the Navy, the designation was changed…
  • p. 353 …In 1968 tests on an AQUILINE prototype at Randsburg Wash on the US Navy's Naval…
  • p. 401 …247, 328 US Marine Corps Reserve 14 US Military Academy at West Point 329 US Navy…
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156
Secret NOFQRO.L
Chapter 3
to working closely with the British from his wartime experience and
believed that their involvement in the U-2 program was a natural as
pect of their alliance with the United States. 113
On the British side, participation in U-2 flights was a logical ex
tension of the close cooperation that already existed between the two
countries on the U-2 program . T he direct involvement of the British
also enabled them to conduct additional flights in areas such as the
Middle East that were of more intelligence interest to the United
Kingdom than to the United States. T he British also may have rea
soned that direct participation in the program was the best way to en
sure that they had a right to share in the U-2 's take. Otherwise, the
United States might decide at some: point to cut off the flow of U-2
photography, as it had done during the 1956 Suez Crisis.
By November 1958, British pi lots had joined Detachment B, and
arrangements had been made for the: title to the aircr.ift they would be
using to be transferred on paper to the British Government. In a final
exchange of letters between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister
Macmillan in December, the President summarized the lines of au
thority for the joint program: "Br itish missions are carried out on
your authority and are your responsibility just as our activities are au
thorized and controlled here in accordance with the procedures I have
established. In this sense, it could be: said that we are carrying out two
complementary programs rather than a joint one.·· IIJ
Richard Bissell had achieved his goal of gaining another source
of approval for overflights of the Soviet Union. In late 1959 and early
1960 , this arrangement proved its value when British pilots conducted
two highly successful missions over Soviet missile testing facilities at
a time when President Eisenhower had not authorized an overflight
for almost six months (see chapter 4). Most flights by the RAF pilots
in Detachment B, however, took place in the Middle East. where the
United Kingdom carried out 27 missions during the two years its pi
lots took part in overflights.
In Britain, the cover story for the RAF participation in the U-2
program was that British fliers were being trained to fly high-altitude
weather-sampling missions for the !RAF weather service. To support
this cover, a U-2 was ferried to Watton RAF Base, England, in early
'" Goodpaster interview (S).
,,. OSA History. ch:ip. 13. pp. I 0-11 (TS Cod,:word).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.