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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …Ry, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems w21s the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell 's weather research cover re…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 157 …2 flight over the Black Sea that never violated Soviet airspace revealed 12 attempts at interception…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threat,ening as the blockade of l 948…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig inal U-2s with the 175 engines. 10" Detachment…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 194 …program in I 974, but RAF pilots never again conducted an overt1ight in an Agency U…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on l May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pil,ots never…
  • p. 227 …Both were expe rienced with World War II aircraft, although Vito had never flown the rebels…
  • p. 248 …It was short of both pilots and planes and never had more than three U-2s…
  • p. 257 …This was an electronic intelligence mission that, in ac cordance with the new guidelines, never came…
  • p. 264 251 Seu et NOFOAN Chapter 5 There was never another Agency U-2 mission from an…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabii izers." THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the 158 was never used in a Navy aircraft. "OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 303 …the J58 had to reach performance levels never before achieved by a jet engine. while operating…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and lockon modes, a fact that…
  • p. 317 …strongly opposed it and the 303 Committee never forwarded the proposal to President Johnson. 5" The…
  • p. 318 …The OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain, taxied to the runway and took off…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in Chielf…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
  • p. 348 …a 16-kilogram VHF recorder for communications intelligence (COMINT), was never used and was transferred to…
  • p. 349 …a mission over the Soviet Union that never took place. Systems-XI through XV were ECM…
  • p. 356 …Project SANDY HOOK never advanced very far in develop ment; projected high costs and substantial technical…
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156
Secret NOFQRO.L
Chapter 3
to working closely with the British from his wartime experience and
believed that their involvement in the U-2 program was a natural as
pect of their alliance with the United States. 113
On the British side, participation in U-2 flights was a logical ex
tension of the close cooperation that already existed between the two
countries on the U-2 program . T he direct involvement of the British
also enabled them to conduct additional flights in areas such as the
Middle East that were of more intelligence interest to the United
Kingdom than to the United States. T he British also may have rea
soned that direct participation in the program was the best way to en
sure that they had a right to share in the U-2 's take. Otherwise, the
United States might decide at some: point to cut off the flow of U-2
photography, as it had done during the 1956 Suez Crisis.
By November 1958, British pi lots had joined Detachment B, and
arrangements had been made for the: title to the aircr.ift they would be
using to be transferred on paper to the British Government. In a final
exchange of letters between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister
Macmillan in December, the President summarized the lines of au
thority for the joint program: "Br itish missions are carried out on
your authority and are your responsibility just as our activities are au
thorized and controlled here in accordance with the procedures I have
established. In this sense, it could be: said that we are carrying out two
complementary programs rather than a joint one.·· IIJ
Richard Bissell had achieved his goal of gaining another source
of approval for overflights of the Soviet Union. In late 1959 and early
1960 , this arrangement proved its value when British pilots conducted
two highly successful missions over Soviet missile testing facilities at
a time when President Eisenhower had not authorized an overflight
for almost six months (see chapter 4). Most flights by the RAF pilots
in Detachment B, however, took place in the Middle East. where the
United Kingdom carried out 27 missions during the two years its pi
lots took part in overflights.
In Britain, the cover story for the RAF participation in the U-2
program was that British fliers were being trained to fly high-altitude
weather-sampling missions for the !RAF weather service. To support
this cover, a U-2 was ferried to Watton RAF Base, England, in early
'" Goodpaster interview (S).
,,. OSA History. ch:ip. 13. pp. I 0-11 (TS Cod,:word).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.