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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …following day, when the next U-2 mission f m the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 ( 18 March 1957), OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 7…
  • p. 142 …where they would not interfere with the control surfaces. At the ends of these poles, completely…
  • p. 147 …To take ad vantage of these weaknesses, Detachment C staged three missions from Alaska into the…
  • p. 156 …After these missions, penetrat ion overflights became a rarity. There would be only six more during…
  • p. 167 …U-2 missions. To handle U-2 material, the British created a new control system, which…
  • p. 168 …The British missions would be operationally controlled by CIA project headquarters. Soon afterward four British pilots…
  • p. 169 …where the United Kingdom carried out 27 missions during the two years its pi lots took…
  • p. 170 157 Sec, et MOF'ORI\I Chapter 3 May 1959, and used to fly weather missions…
  • p. 180 …The excellent photography from tnis mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts diid…
  • p. 188 …some Soviet airborne-missile fire-control systems. Operation GRAND SLAM, mission 4154 and the 24th deep…
  • p. 191 …key project personnel assembled in the Agency control center that morning (with the exception of Bissell…
  • p. 196 …in cor respondence with Abel's "wife., (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November…
  • p. 204 …in .the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 237 …In reality, however, the United States would maintain strict control over the missions to be flown…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
  • p. 348 …System-I used S- and X-band ELINT receivers to collect ground-controlled intercept and air…
  • p. 400 387 Sec1 et NOFORN mission 2023 108 mission 2029 124 mission 3086 200 mission 3088 200…
154
See, et NOFOAN
Chapter 3
become involved in the U-2 project in September 1956, when the
United States supplied them with photography from U-2 missions. To
handle U-2 material, the British created a new control system, which
later merged with the US control system. By 1957 cooperation be
tween the United Kingdom and the United States had expanded to
include frequent consultation between the requirements and photo
interpretation organizations of both countries. James Reber and
Arthur Lundahl made periodic trips to the United Kingdom for
discussions with Alan Crick's UK Requirements Committee (gener
ally known as the Crick Committee, later as the Joint Priorities
Committee), the Joint Intelligence Committee, the Joint Air Recon
naissance Intelligence Center, and MI-6. 108
The idea of using British pilots in the U-2 program first arose in
the spring of 1957, when Richard Bissell-upset that his aircraft had
not been allowed to fly over the Soviet Union since the December
1956 standdown-was searching for ways to reduce the political risks
of overflights and thus obtain more frequent authorization for mis
sions over the Soviet Union. One of his proposals was to use non-US
pilots-possibly British-to increase the possibility of plausible de
nial in the event of a loss. At a meeting with key CIA, Defense
Department, and State Department officials on 6 May 1957, President
Eisenhower approved the concept of British participation in the U-2
• IC>'J
proJect.
During the next six months, Dulles and Bissell met with Sir Dick
White, head of MI-6, and Air Vice Marshal William M. L.
MacDonald, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Intelligence, on sev
eral occasions to discuss the proposal in general terms. At first the
CIA did not push the proposal too hard because at the same meeting
in which he approved British participation, President Eisenhower had
consented to the resumption of U-2 missions over the Soviet Union,
resulting in 10 overflights during the summer and early fall of 1957.
But when flights ceased in October, the thought of British participa
tion became more attractive. By early 1958, Bissell was pressing the
British to begin training pilots in the U-2 even though no final politi
cal decision on their participation had been made. On 7 February
1958, Bis sell instructed the Chief of Station in Londonj~---~__J
to ask Air Vice Marshal MacDonald if the RAF was prepared to
'"" See, for ex:ample, the trip reports of the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee in the
COMIREX records, IC Staff (TS Codeword).
'"' Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum of Conference with the President, 6 May 1957
(TS); idem, "Record of Action-Meeting of May 6, 1957," WHOSS, Alpha, DDEL (TS).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.