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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …Ry, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems w21s the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell 's weather research cover re…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 157 …2 flight over the Black Sea that never violated Soviet airspace revealed 12 attempts at interception…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threat,ening as the blockade of l 948…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig inal U-2s with the 175 engines. 10" Detachment…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 194 …program in I 974, but RAF pilots never again conducted an overt1ight in an Agency U…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on l May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pil,ots never…
  • p. 227 …Both were expe rienced with World War II aircraft, although Vito had never flown the rebels…
  • p. 248 …It was short of both pilots and planes and never had more than three U-2s…
  • p. 257 …This was an electronic intelligence mission that, in ac cordance with the new guidelines, never came…
  • p. 264 251 Seu et NOFOAN Chapter 5 There was never another Agency U-2 mission from an…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabii izers." THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the 158 was never used in a Navy aircraft. "OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 303 …the J58 had to reach performance levels never before achieved by a jet engine. while operating…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and lockon modes, a fact that…
  • p. 317 …strongly opposed it and the 303 Committee never forwarded the proposal to President Johnson. 5" The…
  • p. 318 …The OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain, taxied to the runway and took off…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in Chielf…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
  • p. 348 …a 16-kilogram VHF recorder for communications intelligence (COMINT), was never used and was transferred to…
  • p. 349 …a mission over the Soviet Union that never took place. Systems-XI through XV were ECM…
  • p. 356 …Project SANDY HOOK never advanced very far in develop ment; projected high costs and substantial technical…
152
Sec, et NOFOAN
Chapter 3
Force of 31-with the more powerful Pratt & Whitney 175-Pl3 jet
engine. This new power plant generated 4,200 pounds more thrust
while adding only 2,050 pounds more weight. With its greater power,
the engine permitted the U-2 to reach operational altitude more quick
ly, thereby reducing the telltale contrails that the U-2 produced as it
passed through the tropopause at 45,000 to 55,000 feet. With the new
engine, U-2 passed through this portion of the atmosphere faster and
did so before entering hostile airspace, thus reducing the chance of
visual detection. The 175 power plant also made it possible for the
U-2 to carry a larger payload and gain another 2,500 feet in altitude,
permitting it to cruise at 74,600 feet. The new engines were in very
short supply because of the needs of the Air Force's F-105 construc
tion program, but Colonel Geary used his Air Force contacts to obtain
an initial supply of 12 engines. The Air Force never equipped its orig
inal U-2s with the 175 engines. 10"
Detachment C in Japan received the first of these re-engined air
craft, known as U-2Cs, in July 1959, and two more arrived in Turkey
for Detachment B in August. All Agency U-2s had the new engines
by the summer of 1962, but by then only seven CIA U-2s remained in
service.
INTERVENTION IN LEBANON, 1958
Although the U-2 was used less and less for its original role of gather
ing strategic intelligence on the Soviet Bloc, it had acquired the new
mission of providing US decisionmakers with up-to-date information
on crisis situations all around the world. The first use of the U-2 to
gather tactical intelligence occurred during the 1956 Suez Crisis.
Afterward, U-2s from the Turkish-based Detachment B conducted pe
riodic overflights to monitor the situation in the troubled Middle East,
and they became especially active during the summer of 1958.
On 15 July 1958, President Eisenhower ordered US troops to
land in Lebanon in response to a request for assistance by Lebanese
President Camille Chamoun. Three months earlier, Eisenhower had
turned down a similar request because the rioting that had led
President Chamoun to ask for American aid had died down before in
tervention became necessary. In July, however, President Eisenhower
saw the overall situation in the Middle East as much more threaten
ing. On 14 July forces aligned toward Egyptian President Gama[
""' OSA History, chap. 16, p. 8 (TS Codeword); Geary interview (S).
Geeret

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.