Documents / Official release
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
“Nevers”34 pages
147 Seeret NOFOAN Chapter 3 President Eisenhower was disturbed by the increased superpower tension that had resulted from violations of Soviet airspace by US balloons and aircraft because he still hoped to enter into arms I imita tion negotiations with the Soviets. On 8 September 1958, the United States sent a note to the Soviet Union calling for a Soviet answer to US proposals for a " study of the technical aspects of safeguards against the possibility of surprise attack... One week later the S,oviets agreed to participate and suggested that the talks begin in Geneva on IO November I 958. President Eisenhower was also attempting tt:> per suade the Soviet Union to begin talks aimed at eliminating the atmo spheric testing of nuclear weapons. These efforts began with a 22 A ugust 1958 offer to suspend US nuclear tests for one year on the condition that the Soviet Union al so refrain from further tests and join in negotiations. On 30 August, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev ac cepted the proposal and agreed to start talks on 3 I October 1958 in Geneva. When the talks began, however, the Soviets refused to agree to a test ban and carried out nuclear tests at Semipalatinsk on I and 3 November. Nevertheless, during the late summer and early autumn of 1958, President Eisenhower. detennined to reduce to a minimum any aggravation of the Soviets. kept the U-2 overflight program in [. b 10 1 _ 1_ro o. In November 1958, relations with the Soviet Union worsened af ter Khrushchev prec ipitated a new crisis over West Berlin by an nouncing plans to sign a peace treaty with East Germany by May 1959. He stated that such a treaty would terminate Allied rights in West Berlin. Four days later, Soviet troops began harassing US Anny truck convoys on the highways leading from West Germany to West Berlin. Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threat,ening as the blockade of l 948-49, President Eisenhower wished to :avoid any actions that would provoke the Soviets. Tension over West Berlin was, therefore, an additional reason for continuing to keep the U-2 away from the Soviet Bloc. oo: CONCERNS ABOUT SOVIET COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST THE U-2 Another reason for President Eisenhower's gro~ ing re l!J.~ ance to au thorize flights over the Soviet Union may have ~ en c~ ;rn , hat the Soviets were developing countenneasures that would enable them to " " Ambrose. Eisenhower: The President. pp. 489-J9 I. "'' Ibid.. pp. 502-504. Secret
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.