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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 22 …11 Air Force headquarters soon approved Martin's proposal to mod- •ify" the B-57 and…
  • p. 54 …the DCI Jfor Planning and Coordination I Headquarters CIA USAF -125 I I I Foreign…
  • p. 55 …total of 357 personnel divided among project headquarters, a US test ing faci lity. and three…
  • p. 56 …until it moved into the new CIA Headquarters building at Langley in March 1962. The final…
  • p. 73 …On 3 August 1955, Dulles and Twining met at SAC headquarters in Omaha to sign the…
  • p. 102 …U-2 project officer, the Air Force Headquarters project officer, and NACA's top official, Dr…
  • p. 107 …did not have to report to higher headquarters. WRSP-1, known within the Agency as Detachment…
  • p. 117 …Late on the evening of 3 July, Bissell went to project headquarters in the Matomic Building…
  • p. 127 …The PARAMOUNT Committee worked inside PID headquarters in the Steuart Building. Composed of members from CIA…
  • p. 138 …later and promptly reported the conversation to headquarters. When details of Vito's close call reached…
  • p. 153 …project headquarters had already decided that Western Europe was not a satisfactory location for overflights of…
  • p. 168 …110 In June 1958, representatives from the British Air Ministry came to project headquarters for an…
  • p. 191 …commander at Adana, co Air Force Europe headquarters. and co the Chief of Station at Ankara…
  • p. 194 …Because the new government had not been briefed on the U-2, Project Headquarters refused to…
  • p. 205 …its own building to the new CIA Headquarters at Langley. Soon afterward. Col. Stanley W. Beerli…
  • p. 235 …the pilot reported the incident to Headquarters. The Office of Security immediately con tacted the Pennsylvania…
  • p. 312 …that the performance of an A-12 with J75 engines (as suggested by project headquarters for…
  • p. 319 …been deployed in North Vietnam.61 Project Headquarters in Langley planned and directed all operational BLACK…
  • p. 323 …Project headquarters informed Deputy Defense Secretary Vance on lO January I 967 that the A- l…
  • p. 324 …President Johnson con firmed this decision on 21 May."9 - - - Project headquarters selected 8 June 1968…
  • p. 334 …Air Force personnel served at all levels of the recon naissance program, from project headquarters to…
  • p. 365 …Speech given by Richard Bissell at CIA Headquarters, 12 October 1965 (Top Secret Codeword). Interview with…
3
Interrogation of returning Germans offered only fragmentary in
formation, and this source could not be expected to last much longer.
As a result, in the late 1940s, the US Air Force and Navy began trying
to obtain aerial photography of the Soviet Union. The main Air Force
effort involved Boeing RB-47 aircraft (the reconnaissance version of
the B-47 jet-propelled medium bomber) equipped with cameras and
electronic "ferret" equipment that enabled aircrews to detect tracking
by Soviet radars. At that time the Soviet Union had not yet com
pletely ringed its borders with radars, and much of the interior also
lacked radar coverage. Thus, when the RB-47s found a gap in the
air-warning network, they would dart inland to take photographs of
any accessible targets. These ·'penetration photography" flights
(called SENSINT-sensitive intelligence-missions) occurred along
the northern and Pacific coasts of Russia. One RB-47 aircraft even
managed to fly 450 miles inland and photograph the city of Igarka in
Siberia. Such intrusions brought protests from Moscow but no Soviet
military response. 3
In 1950 there was a major change in Soviet policy. Air defense
units became very aggressive in defending their airspace, attacking all
aircraft that came near the borders of the Soviet Union. On 8 April
1950, Soviet fighters shot down a US Navy Privateer patrol aircraft
over the Baltic Sea. Following the outbreak of the Korean war in June
1950, the Soviet Union extended its "severe air defense policy'' to
the Far East. In the autumn of 1951, Soviet aircraft downed a twin-en
gine US Navy Neptune bomber near Vladivostok. An RB-29 lost in
the Sea of Japan on 13 June 1952 was probably also a victim of
Soviet fighters. The United States was not the only country affected
by the new aggressive Soviet air defense policy; Britain and Turkey
also reported attacks on their planes.4
' A. L. George. Case Studies of Actual and Alleged Overflights. 1930-1953, Rand Study
RM-1349 (Santa Monica: Rand. 1955) (S). Arthur S. Lundahl and Dino Brugioni, inter
view by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape recording. Washington. DC. 14 December 1983 (TS
Codeword). Recordings, transcript5, and notes for the interviews conducted for this study
are on file at the DCI History Staff.
' Jeffrey Richelson states on page 121 of American Espionage and the Soviet Target (New
York: Morrow, 1987) that "the first recorded attack by Soviet air defense forces, in this
case fighters. occurred on October 22. 1949." In this incident, however, Soviet fighters did
not attempt to hit the US aircrati; they merely fired warning shots. The real change in
Soviet policy did not occur until the April 1950 downing of the US Navy Privateer.
George, Case Studies, pp. 1-2. 6, 9-16 (S).
Sec, et NOF=ORI\J
Chapter 1
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.