Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 24 …Instead of a conventional landing gear, Johnson proposed using two skis and a reinforced belly rib…
  • p. 25 …a perceived shortcoming of the Lockheed design." Another factor in the rejection of Kelly Johnson's…
  • p. 26 …19 On 7 June 1954, Kelly Johnson received a letter from the Air Force rejecting the…
  • p. 27 …Gardner described Kelly Johnson's proposal and showed the drawings to Strong. After this meeting. Strong…
  • p. 30 …To make Kelly Johnson' s revolutionary design a reality, one addit ional source of support was…
  • p. 42 …it. A lthough Land had heard Allen Donovan '' James R. Killian. Jr.. interview by Donald E…
  • p. 48 …do the job in Johnson's airplane. And further, I overlaid a curve showing that with…
  • p. 57 …demanding, and Kelly Johnson agreed that such a move would save a lot of money. Lockheed…
  • p. 58 …Ben A. Rich (current head of the "Skunk Works"). interview by Donald E. Welzenbach and Gregory…
  • p. 69 …staff) flew over Nevada with Kelly Johnson in a small Beechcraft plane piloted by Lockheed's…
  • p. 72 …This responsibility has placed a heavy burden on the Office of Security for establishing procedures to…
  • p. 79 …Battin suggested the method used by Nazi war criminal Hermarnn Goering, a thin glass ampule containing…
  • p. 81 …Kelly Johnson used a '·wet-wing" design for the U-2, which meant that fuel was…
  • p. 89 …Airspeed was such a critical factor that Kelly Johnson added a vernier adjustment to the throttle…
  • p. 162 …By late 1957, Johnson agreed that something had to be done. After a series of tests…
  • p. 276 …The committee examined two other Kelly Johnson designs at this meeting-a tailless subsonic aircraft with…
  • p. 324 …OXCART did win a temporary reprieve in late November 1967. The Johnson administration decided to keep…
143
Sewet NOFOHN
Chapter 3
DECLINING OVERFLIGHT ACTIVITY
·operation SOFf TOUCH (4-27 August 1957) proved to be the high
water mark of U-2 operations against the Soviet Union. Detachment
B staged one more overflight on IO September 1957. when a U-2 pi
loted by Wi lliam Hall flew from Adana to photograph the Kapustin
Yar M i ssile Test Range for the first time since the RAF's overflight in
1953, obtaining photographs of a large medium-range ball istic missile
(MRBM) on the launchpad. Six days later Detachment C conducted
its successful overflight of the lCBM impact site at Kl yuchi, and
October saw the final two overfl ights of Detachment A . After these
missions, penetrat ion overflights became a rarity. There would be
only six more during the next 32 months: one, in 1958; two. in 1959;
and three, in 1960 (one of which was unsuccessful). During this
period, President Eisenhower did authorize a number of fl ights along
Soviet border areas that occasionally penetrated shon distances inside
the border. but the Chief Executive had become extremely wary of
authorizing ' 'deep penetration·• overflights. which invariably brought
protests from Moscow.
The border flights took place under tight controls. Begi nning in
the fall of 1957, all messages from Washington to Adana giving coor
dinates for flights along the Soviet border contained the statement:
" This is not a penetration overflight'' and warned about flying too
close to Soviet borders. The Soviets even attempted to shoot down
U-2 at Bodo, Norway
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.