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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

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Chapter 3
On its way to Semipalatinsk. the 21 August m1ss1on tle:w a
search pattern over the western end of Lake Balkash looking for an
other Soviet missi le-related installation and made the first photo
graphs of what was later determined to be the new missile test center
at Saryshagan. This faci lity was used to test radars against incoming
missiles fired from Kapustin Yar, I .400 miles to the west. Sarysh:agan
later became the center fo r the development of the Soviet Union's ad
vanced antiballistic missile (ABM) weapon system .
On 23 August 1957, DDC I Cabell, Richard Bissell, and Air
Force Chief of Staff Twining met with President Eisenhower to re:port
on the results of Operation SOFT TOUCH. T hey showed the
President some of the photographic results of the earlier missions and
reported on the effects of the antiradar measures. Although the
antiradar measures had not proved successful, the photographic yield
from the missions was extremely valuable. Bissell then informed! the
·President that the SOFT TOUCH operation was just about to con
clude with the transfer of the aircraft back to Adana. He asked per
mission for one of the U-2s to make another overflight of the Soviet
Union on this return trip, but the President denied the request. not
wishing to conduct any more overflights than were necessary.~'
THE DECLINE OF DETACHMENT A
During the summer of 1957, all overflights of the Soviet Union were
conducted by either Detachment B or Detachment C. Detachment A
in Germany was a less desirable starting point for overfl ights of the
Soviet Union because such missions had to cross Eastern Europe first,
increasing the likelihood of detection and diplomatic protests.
Furthermore, the Soviet Union's air defense and radar networks were
strongest along its western borders. so Detachment B missions over
the southern portion of the Soviet Union and Detachment C missions
- Mission folder 4045 (10 August 1957) and 4050 (21 August 1957). OSA records. job
67-B-972. box 3 (TS Codeword).
" Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum for the Record, 23 August 1957. WHOSS. Alpha.
DDEL (TS).

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.