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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 12 later, at press conferences in February and July 1. 964, President Lyndon B. Johnson revealed the…
  • p. 40 …and meetings with every major unit of the US defense and intelligence establish ments. After receiving…
  • p. 98 …The Soviet Union sent strongly worded protest notes to the United States and the nations from…
  • p. 102 …not only press releases and the public Line to be taken, but also the suspension of…
  • p. 107 …in the United Kingdom. At about the ' Ibid.. pp. 17-18 (TS Codeword). ' Press Release of…
  • p. 112 …at a press conference that the Soviet Union might be ahead of the United States in…
  • p. 125 …Dial Press. 1982), pp. 45-47. '' Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword). ~eeret
  • p. 167 …By 1957 cooperation be tween the United Kingdom and the United States had expanded to include…
  • p. 174 …Defense Department officials pressed President Eisenhower to authorize renewed overflights to gather up-to-date in…
  • p. 183 …On the 9 April overflight, the U-2 's ELINT-collection unit (System VI) indicated Soviet…
  • p. 195 …in the press about the presence of "spyplanes" on Japanese territory, asked the United States to…
  • p. 198 …DCI records (S). " United States Congress. Senate. Foreign Relations Committee. £recutive Sessions of tlze Sencae Foreign…
  • p. 307 …By 1962 the United States had become aware of the effectiveness of a new Soviet radar…
  • p. 315 …To preserve the secrecy of the OXCART program, the Air Force informed the press that an…
  • p. 328 …at times when the press and Congress alleged that the United States was falling behind the…
  • p. 362 …Smithsonian Institute Press, l 985. Khrushchev. Nikita S. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament. Boston: Little, Brown…
  • p. 401 …United Kingdom (See Great Britain) United Kingdom Requirements Committee 154 United Nations 20 United Press International…
134
Gee. et NOl'OFUQ
Chapter 3
The search for a new home for Detachment C led the Agency to
ask the Air Force in the autumn of 1956 for permission to locate the
detachment at Yokota AFB, Japan. Because Yokota was already the
base for one covert project (the very secret Air Force Project BLACK
KNIGHT using RB-57s), Air Force Chief of Staff Twining did not
wish to locate another one there and denied the reques t. The Agency
then turned co the Navy, which granted permission for Detachmernt C
to use the Naval Air Station at Atsugi, Japan. The Japan.ese
Government received no notification of the proposed deployment be
cause at that time it had no control over activities involving US mili
tary bases in Japan. Deployment of Detachment C began in early
1957 but was complicated by a recent decision to permit the families
of Project AQUATONE employees to accompany them on overseas
tours. As a result, program managers had to find housing facilities on
the base or in nearby communities, not an easy task in crowded
Japan.""
Detach ment C began conducting m1ss1ons in June 1957 alfter
several aircraft and pilots flew to Eie lson Air Force Base near
Fairbanks, Alaska. Air Force rndar order-of-battle reports and NSA
studies had revealed that the radar network in the Soviet Far East,
wi th antiquated radar sets and personnel of a lower caliber than those
in the western Soviet Union, was relati vely ineffective. To take ad
vantage of these weaknesses, Detachment C staged three missions
from Alaska into the Soviet Far East. The first. on 7/8 June (the air
craft crossed the international date line during the flight), was unable
to photograph its target, the ICBM impact area near Klyuchi on the
Kamchatka Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never
entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph Klyuchi on
19/20 June was marred by a camera malfunction that ruined ev;ery
third frame of photography. This flight was tracked by Soviet radars.
but there was no attempt at interception. After a pause of almost three
months during which Detachment C received a dirty-bird U-2, the de
tachment's third mission over Klyuchi on 15/ 16 September 1957
achieved exce llent results. The radar-deception devices proved in1ef
fective, however. as the U-2 was tracked by Soviet radar and trailed
by five fighters.s'
. , OSA History. ch.ip. l5, pp. 2. 16-19: chap. 16. p. I (TS Co<lcword).
" Mission folders 6002 (8 June 1957). 6005 C!0 June 1957). and 6008 (16 September
l 957). OSA records. job 67-8-3'.!8. bo.~ 7 (TS Codeword).

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.