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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 11 …At great risk, US Air Force and Navy aircraft had been conducting peripheral reconnaissance and shallow…
  • p. 16 …As a result, in the late 1940s, the US Air Force and Navy began trying to…
  • p. 17 …Two months later, on 7 October 1952, Soviet fighter aircraft stalked and shot down a US…
  • p. 72 …The terminology used to describe U-2 aircraft and pilots also played a part in maintaining…
  • p. 94 …The committee issued its l ist of cargets for the use of the entire intelli gence…
  • p. 147 …The Agency then turned co the Navy, which granted permission for Detachmernt C to use the…
  • p. 180 …James Doolittle urged President Eisenhower to use overflights of the Soviet Union to the maximum degree…
  • p. 223 …by Air Force and Navy reconnais sance aircraft. President Kennedy used NPIC photographs to i llustrate…
  • p. 273 …Charyk, and his Navy counterpart, Garrison Norton. Designers from several air craft manufacturers also attended some…
  • p. 283 …This engine had originally been developed for the Navy's large, jet-powered flying boat, the…
  • p. 297 …The need for additional bui ldings on the base was met by the Navy. Three surplus…
  • p. 298 …After hearing Bissell and Holcomb's suggestion that the 158 might be used in future Navy…
  • p. 348 …Following modifications to make System-VII suitable for use by the Navy, the designation was changed…
  • p. 353 …In 1968 tests on an AQUILINE prototype at Randsburg Wash on the US Navy's Naval…
  • p. 401 …247, 328 US Marine Corps Reserve 14 US Military Academy at West Point 329 US Navy…
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Gee. et NOl'OFUQ
Chapter 3
The search for a new home for Detachment C led the Agency to
ask the Air Force in the autumn of 1956 for permission to locate the
detachment at Yokota AFB, Japan. Because Yokota was already the
base for one covert project (the very secret Air Force Project BLACK
KNIGHT using RB-57s), Air Force Chief of Staff Twining did not
wish to locate another one there and denied the reques t. The Agency
then turned co the Navy, which granted permission for Detachmernt C
to use the Naval Air Station at Atsugi, Japan. The Japan.ese
Government received no notification of the proposed deployment be
cause at that time it had no control over activities involving US mili
tary bases in Japan. Deployment of Detachment C began in early
1957 but was complicated by a recent decision to permit the families
of Project AQUATONE employees to accompany them on overseas
tours. As a result, program managers had to find housing facilities on
the base or in nearby communities, not an easy task in crowded
Japan.""
Detach ment C began conducting m1ss1ons in June 1957 alfter
several aircraft and pilots flew to Eie lson Air Force Base near
Fairbanks, Alaska. Air Force rndar order-of-battle reports and NSA
studies had revealed that the radar network in the Soviet Far East,
wi th antiquated radar sets and personnel of a lower caliber than those
in the western Soviet Union, was relati vely ineffective. To take ad
vantage of these weaknesses, Detachment C staged three missions
from Alaska into the Soviet Far East. The first. on 7/8 June (the air
craft crossed the international date line during the flight), was unable
to photograph its target, the ICBM impact area near Klyuchi on the
Kamchatka Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never
entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph Klyuchi on
19/20 June was marred by a camera malfunction that ruined ev;ery
third frame of photography. This flight was tracked by Soviet radars.
but there was no attempt at interception. After a pause of almost three
months during which Detachment C received a dirty-bird U-2, the de
tachment's third mission over Klyuchi on 15/ 16 September 1957
achieved exce llent results. The radar-deception devices proved in1ef
fective, however. as the U-2 was tracked by Soviet radar and trailed
by five fighters.s'
. , OSA History. ch.ip. l5, pp. 2. 16-19: chap. 16. p. I (TS Co<lcword).
" Mission folders 6002 (8 June 1957). 6005 C!0 June 1957). and 6008 (16 September
l 957). OSA records. job 67-8-3'.!8. bo.~ 7 (TS Codeword).

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.