Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 143 …Air Force contract to evaluate ra dars, EG&G operated a small testing facility at Indian…
  • p. 244 …Then in August 1964, following the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, the Air Force assumed responsibility for…
  • p. 381 …232 Indian Springs, Nevada 274. 130, 132 Indonesia 211-212, 214,319 Indonesian Air Force 212…
128
ieeret NOFORN
Chapter 3
remaining opposed to flights over most of the Soviet Union,
Eisenhower finally agreed to permit some flights over peripheral
areas such as Kamchatka Peninsula and Lake Baikal, as well as the
Soviet Union's atomic testing area at Semipalatinsk. Such overflights
could be staged from Pakistan if the Pakistani Government consent
ed. The President rejected the Air Force's request to take over the
U-2 program, stating that he preferred to have the aircraft manned by
civilians "during operations of this kind." 71
The President had once again agreed to allow overflights of the
Soviet Union, although only over certain areas, because the need to
learn more about the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union
was too compelling. In particular, the President and top administra
tion officials wanted to gather more data on the Soviet Union's mis
sile program, a subject for which considerable Soviet boasting-but
no hard data-was available.
Even after he had authorized the resumption of overflights,
President Eisenhower maintained tight control over the program. He
personally authorized each overflight, which meant that Richard
Bissell would bring maps to the White House with the proposed routes
marked on them for the President to examine. More than once, accord
ing to Bissell, Eisenhower spread the map out on his Oval Office desk
for detailed study, usually with his son John (an Army officer serving
as a White House aide) and Colonel Goodpaster looking over his
shoulder. On occasion, the President would pick up a pencil and elimi
nate a flight leg or make some other correction to the flight plan.71
RADAR-DECEPTIVE "DIRTY BIRDS"
One additional reason why President Eisenhower had again autho
rized overflights of the Soviet Union was renewed CIA promises that
Soviet detection or tracking of the U-2 was unlikely. At the 6 May
1957 meeting with the President, Richard Bissell reported on the
progress that had been made in developing radar camouflage and
" Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum of Conft:rence with the President. 6 May 1957
(TS); "Record of Action-Meeting of May 6. 1957," WHOSS, Alpha. DDEL (TS).
'' Bissell interview by Welzenbach (S); Beschloss. Mayday. p. 140.
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.