Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 4 …17 The BEACON HILL Report .................................................................... 17 Concern About the Danger of a Soviet Surprise Attack ................ 19…
  • p. 13 Helen Hill Kleyla and Robert D. O'Hern. This 16-volume Top Secret Codeword study of…
  • p. 14 …view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became…
  • p. 30 …Dulles The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even more assistance from scientists…
  • p. 31 …Their head quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the…
  • p. 32 …et NOFOAN Chapter 1 document on 15 June 1952, the BEACON HILL Report advocated radical approaches…
  • p. 34 …Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL…
  • p. 37 …sance needs ex.pressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel. any…
  • p. 41 …H. T. Friis R. Mettler A.G. Hill E. Purcell W. H. Radford E. H. Plesset…
  • p. 44 …members had been discussing since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings. James Baker was…
  • p. 45 …Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence Systems Panel, several Project Three members…
  • p. 344 …He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later became director of Lincoln Laboratories. PARANGOSKY…
  • p. 345 …of several advisory panels, including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what cameras to…
  • p. 364 …BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June…
  • p. 371 …Soviet Union 137 Beacon Hill 17-19. 21. 24, 3 1-32. 331-33'.! BEACON HILL…
125
warnings to all pilots about the danger of opening the helmet face
plate at high altitudes, several pilots were known to do so. Some ate
candy bars; Vito favored lemon drops. On the morning of 10
December, while Vito was undergoing prebreathing, the Air Force en
listed man who oversaw his preflight regimen placed an L-pill in the
righthand knee pocket of Vito's flight suit, unaware that this pocket
also contained Vito's supply of lemon drops. After he took off. Vito
began indulging in his habit of sucking lemon drops. About midway
into the mi ssion, he opened his faceplate and popped into his mouth
what he thought was another lemon drop. After closing the faceplate,
he began sucking on the object and thought it strange that it hard no
flavor and was much smoother than the previous lemon drops.
Although tempted to bite down, Vito decided instead to reopeIn his
faceplate and see what it was he had in his mouth. Spicting the object
into his hand, he saw that he had been sucking on the L-pi ll wi1th its
lethal contents of potassium cyanide. Just a thin layer of glass. had
stood between him and death. The loss of his aircraft over Bulgaria
would have exposed the U-2 program to worldwide publicity and
would probably have resulted in an early end to overflights.""
. . . _ Detachment A's security officer overheard Vito relating: the
L-pill story to a fellow pilot several days later and promptly reported
the conversation to headquarters. When details of Vito's close call
reached Washington. James Cunningham immediately ordered L --pills
placed in boxes so that there wou ld be no chance of mistaking them
for anything else. The L-pill continued to be available for another
three years. Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachmernt B.
Col. William Shelton, raised an important question that had niever
been considered: what would happen if an L-pill with its volati le con
tents accidentally broke inside the cockpit of a U-2? Realizing that
such an accident would result i n the death of the pilot, James
Cunningham ordered the destruction of all L-pills and then turned to
the Technical Services Division (TSO) for a better idea. By this time
the state of the art in lethal devices was a needle poisoned with cJ1lgal,
an extremely deadly shellfish toxi n. The needle was hidden in a tiny
hole in a silver dollar supplied by Cunningham. Only one poison--nee
dle coin was made because Cunningham decided that, if any pilo1t had
to use it because of capture, there would probably not be any more
h 6soverfl.1g ts.
"' Cunningham interview (TS Codeword); Carmine Vito. interview by Donald E.
Welzenbach. Washington, DC. 7 May 1986 (S).
~• Cable from Detachment B to Development Projects Division (DPD). 4 January 1960;
cabk: from DPD to Detachment 8, 7 January 1960. OSA records, job 67-B-972. box 18,
"Operation KNIFE EDGE" (TS Codeword).
Sec, et NOFORN
Chapter 3

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.