Documents / Official release
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
“Headquarters”22 pages
123 Secretary of State Dulles said that, although he essentially agreed with the President's comments, he thought that "really impor tant results" might be obtained by a seven to 10-day operation. He, nevertheless, questioned the long-term value of the results. DDCI Cabell replied that U-2 photographs would be useful much longer than the Secretary of State had implied because they would establish a reference bank of geographic and manmade features. Siding with Cabell, Admiral Radford pointed out the need for more intelligence to make estimates better. President Eisenhower was not convinced by these arguments. Although willing to consider extensions of the radar-seeking ferret flights he had authorized along the Soviet borders. he remained op posed to penetration flights over the Soviet Union. Events in Eastern Europe in the fall of l 956 helped to change the President's mind. In October the Soviet Union backed away fro m a confrontation with nationalist Communist leaders in Poland only to find itself facing a similar situation in Hungary, where mass demon strations led to the formation of a new government under Imre Nagy • on· 23 October 1956. Soviet troops and tanks temporarily withdrew from Budapest while awaiting reinforcements. By early November, however, the Kremlin leadership decided that events in Hungary were getting out of hand-particularly when Premier Nagy announced his nation's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact-and ordered Soviet troops to suppress the Hungarian uprising. Although President Eisenhower deplored the Soviet intervention. he turned down CIA re quests for permission to airdrop arms and supplies to the Hungarian rebels. In fact, the President forbid all overflights of that nation, in cluding those by U-2 aircraft, and none was made.60 Although President Eisenhower had not been willing to allow overflights during the Hungarian crisis, the Soviet Union's actions in Hungary convinced him to authorize renewed overflights of the Soviet Bloc, a decision that was made easier by his reelection by a large margin in early November. Initially. however, the President only authorized overflights of Eastern Europe and Soviet border regions, not the deep penetration overfl ights that had been requested by CIA. At a 15 November 1956 meeting with Acting Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr. (John Foster Dulles was recovering from cancer ~• Cunningham interview (TS Codeword). -5-ec,-et NOFORN Chapter 3
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.