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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …following day, when the next U-2 mission f m the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 ( 18 March 1957), OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 7…
  • p. 142 …where they would not interfere with the control surfaces. At the ends of these poles, completely…
  • p. 147 …To take ad vantage of these weaknesses, Detachment C staged three missions from Alaska into the…
  • p. 156 …After these missions, penetrat ion overflights became a rarity. There would be only six more during…
  • p. 167 …U-2 missions. To handle U-2 material, the British created a new control system, which…
  • p. 168 …The British missions would be operationally controlled by CIA project headquarters. Soon afterward four British pilots…
  • p. 169 …where the United Kingdom carried out 27 missions during the two years its pi lots took…
  • p. 170 157 Sec, et MOF'ORI\I Chapter 3 May 1959, and used to fly weather missions…
  • p. 180 …The excellent photography from tnis mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts diid…
  • p. 188 …some Soviet airborne-missile fire-control systems. Operation GRAND SLAM, mission 4154 and the 24th deep…
  • p. 191 …key project personnel assembled in the Agency control center that morning (with the exception of Bissell…
  • p. 196 …in cor respondence with Abel's "wife., (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November…
  • p. 204 …in .the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 237 …In reality, however, the United States would maintain strict control over the missions to be flown…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
  • p. 348 …System-I used S- and X-band ELINT receivers to collect ground-controlled intercept and air…
  • p. 400 387 Sec1 et NOFORN mission 2023 108 mission 2029 124 mission 3086 200 mission 3088 200…
121
~.,et NOFORP4
Chapter 3
facilities available, and the film had to be flown to Wiesbaden, adding
a 10- to 15-hour delay. During the gradual buildup of the crisis, this
delay had been tolerated, but, once actual hostilities broke out, US
decisionmakers needed a more rapid response. On 29 October,
Richard Bissell ordered Lundahl to establish a fi lm-processing facility
at Adana. Two PlD employees went to Adana on 13 November to set
up the facility, and two photointerpreters moved from Wiesbaden to
Adana to help in the effort. Forward processing was, however, ham
pered by the location of the Adana facility on a tlat, arid plain in
southern Turkey, 35 miles from the Mediterranean at the very end of a
long supply line.
The PID team obtained and outfitted a trailer for film processing,
but many problems had to be overcome. The first major problem was
obtaining enough clean water. Detachment B personnel, therefore,
purchased large amounts of borax locally for use in purifying water.
In fact, they bought so much borax on the local market that one of
them was arrested by the Turkish police. who believed he was using
the chemical to make drugs. It was also difficult to obtain a constant
source of developers and fixers for processing the U-2 film, si nce the
large Air Force supply facility at Wheelus AFB in Libya refused to
provide the needed photographic chemicals. When PIO personnel ac
companied processed film from Turkey to the United States, they re
turned to Turkey sitting atop cartons of chemicals for the next day's
processing. At first, film was developed in improvised tanks using
flimsy wooden spools and hand-turned cranks to move the film
through the solutions. Later, the Adana facility moved from its trailer
to a building and received more up-to-date processing equipment. As
was the case with the photo lab in Germany, the Adana lab's person
nel came from the Agency and the armed forces.57
The need to produce very timely intelligence diminished after
the British and French agreed to a cease-fire on 7 November 1956. By
the end of the month, foreign troops began evacuating Egyptian terri
tory, and the pressure on the Adana photointerpretation unit eased.
The facility remained in existence, however, and was used twice in
December 1956 and 11 times in the first half of 1957. It was then
placed in caretaker status, for emergency use only.
" NP/C History. vol. I. pp. 53-54 (S): Lun<hhl ~nd Brugioni in terview (TS Codeword).
Geeret

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.