Documents / Official release
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
“Mission Control”27 pages
115 The Suez Crisjs was a major turning point in the use of the U-2 airplane. Before this crisis, the U-2 had been seen solely as a collector of strategic intelligence, with high-quality results considered more important than speed. U-2 film had, therefore, been returned to the manufacturer for optimum development and then interpreted in Washington using the most up-to-date devices. Now. because of the Middle East crisis, Project AQUATONE was expected to perform like a tactical reconnaissance unit, developing film immediately after landing for instant interpretation or "readout." Photo-Intelligence Division personnel assigned to Project HTAUTOMAT (U-2 film ex ploitation), therefore, had to arrange for forward processing of the U-2 film to avoid unacceptable delays in providing intelligence on tactical developments around Suez. PIO acted quickly co carry out its new assignment. Lundahl and Reber flew from the United Kingdom to US Air Force Europe head quarters in Wiesbaden on 12 September to make arrangements for processing and inte retin U-2 film in West Gennany. They had C been preceded by:.,;--,r;,.,.-.,...,..-,.-,.,..,....,-..,.1 hief of PIO's Special · Projects Branch. Following eta1 e sions with Air Force photo- . intelligence personnel, the CIA representatives arranged to use a por tion of a nea,by Air F-; photo laboratory for developing U-2 film. With the assistance ofl lchi7~TAUTOMAT photo laboratory, and 1r t-orce personnel,L__J had the lab ready for processing on the following day, when the next U-2 mission f m the Middle East. After quickly developing the film, d his joint staff of CIA and armed forces personnel stud- 1 d 1t or indications of British and French preparations for hostilities and sent their first report to Washington on 15 September. Although the Air Force provided considerable assistance in es tablishing! [photo laboratory, Air Force officials did not like the idea of CIA personnel controlling overseas photo processing and interpretation centers, which were normally under Air Force con trol. Further negotiations led to a CIA-Air Force agreement at the end of October. under which the Air Force would name the commanding officer for such installations and the CIA would designate the deputy, who was responsible for technical and intelligence matters:' PIO soon added two photointerpreters and a lab technician to the West German operation, which continued to develop and interpret U-2 photography of the Middle East throughout September and ' ' Ibid.. pp. 49-52 (S). ~etNOFORN Chapter 3 Geeret
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.