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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 24 …April 1954. Lo.:khec:d Corporation. Advanced Devdopmcnt Projec:ts Divi~ion. Burbank. California. Sec,et
  • p. 58 …Pedlow, Burbank, California, 26 August 1988. 6eeret 11
  • p. 85 …how to transfer Lockheed employees from Burbank to Area 5 l without arousing a great deal…
  • p. 273 …SP-1362, "History of the OXCART Program," Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Burbank, CA. I July 1968, p…
  • p. 287 …designed trailer truck that carried it from Burbank to Area 5 I. By 18 November 1959…
  • p. 296 …not test the OXCART aircraft at its Burbank facility, where the runway was too short and…
  • p. 297 …Construction began in September 1960; a C-47 shuttle s,ervice ferried work crews from Burbank…
  • p. 299 …The plane left Burbank on 26 February 1962 and arrived at Area 51 two days later…
  • p. 304 …into the engine nacelles during assembly at Burbank were sucked into the power plant during initial…
  • p. 372 …293 BUORL 22 Burbank. California 45 &eeret NOFe"N Index Burke. William 168 120 114 Byeloruss1a…
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Chapter 3
112
No one in the White House, the CIA, or the Air Force could reveal
that U-2 photographs had actually provided the primary evidence for
this change in the estimates."
The need to keep the existence of the U-2 program secret caused
problems even within the CIA itself. The Office of Security sharply
restricted the number of persons who could be cleared for access to
U-2 photography. The special clearance was granted on a "slot" ba
sis, and only the person assigned to a particular position or "slot"
could have the clearance. The U-2 photographs were kept in a secure
room, and only those with special clearances were admitted to the
room. In addition, the Office of Security considered U-2 information
too sensitive to use in CIA publications. As a result, many analysts
did not have access to information that would have greatly aided the
production of intelligence estimates:1
TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FROM U-2s
DURING THE SUEZ CRISIS
Although U-2s had ceased flying over the Soviet Bloc because of
President Eisenhower's standdown order, they could still be used
elsewhere in the world. The Middle East would be the next area for
U-2 operations. On 26 July 1956, Egyptian President Gama! Abdel
Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company in retaliation for the de
cision by the United States and the United Kingdom to withdraw fi
nancial support for the Aswan Dam project. Nasser's action provoked
an international crisis that would have a permanent effect on the U-2
program.
Long before the Suez Crisis developed, the CIA had planned to
deploy U-2s in Turkey for use in the Soviet overflight program. On I
May 1956, US Charge d' Affaires Foy D. Kohler approached Turkish
Prime Minister Adnan Menderes on this matter. He told the Prime
Minister that the effort was a continuation of the GENETRIX pro
gram, during which balloons had been released from Turkey, and in
volved aircraft that could fly 10,000 feet higher than any Soviet
plane. Menderes gave his approval immediately. At the time of the
" John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military
Strength (New York: Dial Press. 1982), pp. 45-47.
'' Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.