Documents / Official release
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
“Headquarters”22 pages
110 Sec,el NOFORN Chapter 3 the United States delivered an oral protest concerning overflights of Poland on 20 June and 2 July. This was followed by a protest note from the Czechoslovak Government on 21 July. No formal reply was sent to the two Soviet satellite states. 37 The details of the flightpaths listed in the Soviet and Polish pro tests, along with the subsequent photographic evidence of Soviet in terception attempts, made it clear that U-2s could not fly undetected over the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe and could even be tracked for extended periods of time. This news greatly disturbed President Eisenhower. In a meeting with Allen Dulles on 19 July 1956, the President recalled how he had been told that "not over a very minor percentage of these (flights) would be picked up." He went on to question "how far this should now be pushed, knowing that detection is not likely to be avoided." After discussing the possibility of basing U-2s in the Far East, President Eisenhower went on to say that he had "lost enthusiasm" for the U-2 activity. He noted that, if the United States were on the receiving end of a Soviet overflight operation, "the reaction would be drastic." The President was also concerned that the American public might learn of the overflights and be shocked that their country had violated international law. He stated, "Soviet pro tests were one thing, any loss of confidence by our own people would • th ,, 38be quite ano er. The President's rapid disenchantment with the project was not lost on Richard Bissell. Fearing for the U-2 program's survival, he met with the Land committee in early August 1956 to urge them to help make the U-2 less vulnerable to radar pulses. His goal was to reduce the aircraft's radar cross section so that it would be less sus ceptible to detection. Edward Purcell had some ideas on this and sug gested that he supervise a new project in the Boston area to explore them. At the direction of the Land committee, Bissell set in motion a project known as HTNAMABLE to establish a proprietary firm called the Scientific Engineering Institute (SEI) in Cambridge. Former Air Force Col. Richard S. Leghorn headed the SEI operation for the Agency when it began on 26 November 1956. SEI was staffed by sev eral MIT scholars who conducted studies and experiments into ·" .. Alleged Violations of Soviet Territory: Soviet Note of July I0, 1956 with U.S. Reply," US Department of State Bulletin. 30 July 1956, pp. 191-192; OSA History, chap. 11, pp. 32-33 (TS Codeword). " Andrew J. Goodpaster, Memorandum for the Record. 19 July 1956, WHOSS, Alpha, DDEL (TS). Searet
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.