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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

Open the PDF at page 119 Original source ↗

“The Advance”34 pages

  • p. 6 …255 The Phaseout of the Office of Special Activities ........ ................... 257 0 ) Chapter 6 The U-2…
  • p. 7 …319 Advances in Technology............................................... ........................... 320 Cooperation With the Air Force ............................................................. 321 Impact of the Overhead Reconnaissance…
  • p. 22 …retired from the Air Force to become the assistant director of Lockheed's Advanced Development Program…
  • p. 24 11 / Chapter 1 gravity (g's) instead of the military specification strengLh of 5.33 g…
  • p. 32 …lithium deuteride, a tech nology more advanced than the heavy water method used by US '' BEACON…
  • p. 33 …between the developed and undeveloped nations. This aggressive Soviet foreign policy. combined with advances in nuclear…
  • p. 58 …secrecy in the new project, Kelly Johnson placed it in Lockheed's Advanced Development facility at…
  • p. 65 …His software algorithms made it possible to model lens designs and determine in advance the effects…
  • p. 76 …seen on pilot Francis Gary Powers) advanced gear for the U-2 pilots. David Clark expert…
  • p. 111 …of Soviet advances in long-range bombers and missiles. The initial sighting of the new Soviet…
  • p. 114 …Adenauer be informed in advance of US plans to overfly the Soviet Union from bases in…
  • p. 174 …concentrating on developing the more advanced solid-fueled missiles rather than increasing the num ber of…
  • p. 183 …if the Soviet SAMs received sufficient advanced warning, they posed a major threat to the U…
  • p. 191 …the cover story that had been prepared and distributed in advance of the mission. The first…
  • p. 206 …In 1965 the head of OSA received a new title, Director of Special Activities. The Office…
  • p. 235 …STPOLLY added the more advanced Lockheed P3A in 1963. Between 1955 and 1967, when the CIA…
  • p. 249 …The Defense Department feared that the loss of this device with its highly advanced traveling-wave…
  • p. 250 …Chapter 5 Advanced ECM Equipment for Detachment H Demand for overhead photography of the PRC continued…
  • p. 252 …In addition, the Project TACKLE U-2s began receiving even more advanced ECM • 60 equipment. •• Mission…
  • p. 265 …but some was the result of technological advances. The ini tial order for eight of the…
  • p. 266 …This camera was actually a very advanced version of the original B camera with a new…
  • p. 282 …aircraft from the small inventory of its most advanced bomber. Even had the B-588 program…
  • p. 295 …In fact, it was an advanced version of the highly reliable B camera developed for the…
  • p. 296 …Prospective pilots had to be qualified in the most advanced fighters and be emotionally stable and…
  • p. 307 …advanced experimental jet aircraft, the A-11. which has been tested in sustained flight at more…
  • p. 310 …It was now time to find work for the most advanced aircraft ever conceived and built…
  • p. 321 …advanced aircraft ever .built was to be put out to pasture. The aban donment of the…
  • p. 325 …when the OXCART program ended in the summer of 1968, no mcire advanced successor was wait…
  • p. 326 …The most advanced aircraft of the 20th century had become an anachronism before it was ever…
  • p. 333 …ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY One very important byproduct of the CIA's manned reconnaissance program was the…
  • p. 334 …the end of the usefulness of the world's most advanced aircraft; its offspring, the SR…
  • p. 335 …Thus, the CIA sponsored the development of the world's most advanced aircraft-the OXCART-and…
  • p. 352 …They believed that recent advances in the minia turization of electronic technology would make possible the…
  • p. 356 343 Defense Research and Engineering, John Foster, liked the concept and provided DOD funding for ORD…
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Sect et NOFOffN
Chapter 3
Dulles that if we obtain any information or warning that any of the
flights has been discovered or tracked, the operation should be sus
pended." Goodpaster called both Dulles and Bissell and was told that
reports on tracking or attempted interception of the U-2s would not be
available for another 36 hours. Later that day the two CIA officials
met with Goodpaster to ask if flights could continue in the meantime.
Goodpaster replied that his understanding of the President's directive
was that the operation should continue "at the maximum rate until the
first evidence of tracking was received." 1"
Although President Eisenhower had originally spoken of sus
pending the overflights if they were ''discovered or tracked," his
main concern was to learn if the Soviets could track U-2 missions,
meaning that they could follow the flight on their radar screens for
most or all of the missions and thus have numerous opportunities to
attempt interception. Certainly the President hoped that U-2 flights
could not even be detected, but reports received on the 20 June over
flight of Eastern Europe had already indicated that this goal was unre
alistic. The President's emphasis therefore shifted to tracking. If the
Soviets could successfully track U-2 missions. he wanted the over
flights halted. ! 9 Reports on Soviet radar coverage of the first two
overflights of the Soviet Union became available on 6 July. These re
ports showed that. although the Soviets did detect the aircraft and
made several very unsuccessful attempts at interception. they could
not track U-2s consistently. Interestingly, the Soviet radar coverage
was weakest around the most important targets, Moscow and
Leningrad, and the Soviets did not realize that U-2s had overflown
these two cities.30
Detachment A carried out three more overflights of the Soviet
Union during the 10-day period authorized by the President. Two of
the missions (2020 and 2021) took place on a single day, 9 July 1956.
They covered much of Eastern Europe, and the Ukraine and
Belorussia in the Soviet Union. Unfortunately. a broken camera
" Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum for the Record. 5 July 1956. WHOSS. Alpha.
DDEL (TS).
'" Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster. interview by Donald E. Welzenbach and Gregory W.
Pedlow. Washington. DC. 8 July 1987 (S).
"' Mission fold.:rs 2013 (4 July 1956) and 1014 (5 July 1956). OSA records. job
67-B-328, box 7 (TS Codeword).
~QGFet

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.