Documents / Official release
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
“Indian Air Force”3 pages
106 Sect et NOFOffN Chapter 3 Dulles that if we obtain any information or warning that any of the flights has been discovered or tracked, the operation should be sus pended." Goodpaster called both Dulles and Bissell and was told that reports on tracking or attempted interception of the U-2s would not be available for another 36 hours. Later that day the two CIA officials met with Goodpaster to ask if flights could continue in the meantime. Goodpaster replied that his understanding of the President's directive was that the operation should continue "at the maximum rate until the first evidence of tracking was received." 1" Although President Eisenhower had originally spoken of sus pending the overflights if they were ''discovered or tracked," his main concern was to learn if the Soviets could track U-2 missions, meaning that they could follow the flight on their radar screens for most or all of the missions and thus have numerous opportunities to attempt interception. Certainly the President hoped that U-2 flights could not even be detected, but reports received on the 20 June over flight of Eastern Europe had already indicated that this goal was unre alistic. The President's emphasis therefore shifted to tracking. If the Soviets could successfully track U-2 missions. he wanted the over flights halted. ! 9 Reports on Soviet radar coverage of the first two overflights of the Soviet Union became available on 6 July. These re ports showed that. although the Soviets did detect the aircraft and made several very unsuccessful attempts at interception. they could not track U-2s consistently. Interestingly, the Soviet radar coverage was weakest around the most important targets, Moscow and Leningrad, and the Soviets did not realize that U-2s had overflown these two cities.30 Detachment A carried out three more overflights of the Soviet Union during the 10-day period authorized by the President. Two of the missions (2020 and 2021) took place on a single day, 9 July 1956. They covered much of Eastern Europe, and the Ukraine and Belorussia in the Soviet Union. Unfortunately. a broken camera " Andrew J. Goodpaster. Memorandum for the Record. 5 July 1956. WHOSS. Alpha. DDEL (TS). '" Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster. interview by Donald E. Welzenbach and Gregory W. Pedlow. Washington. DC. 8 July 1987 (S). "' Mission fold.:rs 2013 (4 July 1956) and 1014 (5 July 1956). OSA records. job 67-B-328, box 7 (TS Codeword). ~QGFet
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.