“Lockheed”60+ pages
- p. 4 …8
Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA. ........................................ 13
Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance ............................................... 17
The BEACON…
- p. 6 …260
Competition Between Lockheed and Convair ...................................... 267
The Selection of the Lockheed Design .............. ... ................ ................ 270
Efforts To…
- p. 12 …excellent technical study of the U-2: Lockheed U-2
(l 983).
There has also been…
- p. 22 …Immediately after returning to California, Carter proposed to
Lockheed Vice President L. Eugene Root (previously the…
- p. 23 10
Secret ld0F8RN
Chapter 1
Lockheed also submit a design. Carter noted that the proposed aircraft…
- p. 24 …who then asked Lockheed to Kelly Johnson
. sμbmit a specific proposal. In early April, Kelly Johnson…
- p. 25 .
12
Sec,et NOFORN
Chapter 1
The Lockheed CL-282 Development Planning. According to Wienberg, General…
- p. 26 …Despite the Air Force's selection
of the X-16, Lockheed continued to work on the…
- p. 27 …Proposals for special reconnaissance aircraft have been re
ceived in the Air Staff from Lockheed. Fairchild…
- p. 28 …range are not as good as the
Lockheed CL-282. :;
Gardner's enthusiasm for the CL…
- p. 29 …Few detaiils about Dulles's precise attitude
toward the proposed Lockheed reconnaissance aircraft are available,
but…
- p. 37 …for Philip Strong of the CIA had told him that the
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation had designed…
- p. 39 …Thus, even though
the Lockheed CL-282 had several important sources of support by
September I954…
- p. 40 …Council.'A
Project Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282
Chapter 1
James R. Killian, Jr…
- p. 42 …Agency.~·1
Land learned the details of Lockheed's proposed CL-282 aircraft
soon after he…
- p. 43 30
Sec, et NOFORM
Chapter 1
briefly mention a Lockheed design for a high-flying aircraft…
- p. 44 …During September and October the Project Three study group
met frequently to discuss the Lockheed design…
- p. 47 …The Lockheed super glider will fly at 70,000 feet, well out of the
reach of…
- p. 48 …Putt, to oppose the adoption of the Lockheed design. The officials ar
gued that the Bell…
- p. 49 …He used Gardner's
statement to convince Lockheed's senior management to approve the
project, which…
- p. 50 …small group of prominent scientists that the
Lockheed design represented the best possible overhead reconnais-
sance…
- p. 52 …afternoon of 3 Decembeli, they
' Although the Lockheed CL-282 was not designated as the U…
- p. 53 …r the airframes to be built by Lockheed. His query was
greeted with silence. Everyone present…
- p. 55 …This category in
cluded maintenance and support personnel from Lockheed (five per
aircraft), the pilots, and…
- p. 56 …to be
settled, including the contract with Lockheed. Nevertheless. work on
the U-2 began as…
- p. 57 …A general contractor such as Lockheed
can purchase much, if not all, of the supplies needed…
- p. 58 …During the final contract negotiations in the spring
of 1958, Lockheed and the US Government agreed…
- p. 59 …Aircraft," 9 Dc:cc:mbc:r 195-i.
Lockheed Contract Filc:s. OSA Records (S ).
SeeFet
- p. 61 …F. Boc:hrne. Summary Report:
Reconnaissance Aircraft. Lockheed Aircraft Corpor.ition Report I04'.!0. 28 January…
- p. 63 …1954, even before the CIA adopted
the Lockheed proposal. Baker quickly recognized, however, that he
would…
- p. 69 …1-2 (TS Codeword); Miller, Lockheed U-2. pp. 19-20.
Sea,at
- p. 70 …By July 1955 the base
was ready, and Agency, Air Force, and Lockheed personnel began
moving…
- p. 74 61
project-the construction and testing of the aircraft-remained the ex
clusive province of Lockheed…
- p. 77 …The first model of the
pressure suit, used by Lockheed test pilots, made no provision for…
- p. 79 …Geary told Culbertson that the Lockheed
CL-282 was going to be known officially as the…
- p. 81 …former director of Lockheed's Skunk Works.
10 Donald E. Welzenbach, 14 March 1986 (U): Miller…
- p. 84 …7 (TS Codeword); Miller, Lockheed U-2, p. 22.
"' OSA Hiswry, chap. 8, pp. 12-14…
- p. 85 …how to transfer Lockheed employees
from Burbank to Area 5 l without arousing a great deal…
- p. 88 …Colonel Yancey was in charge of six SAC pilots who were to be
trained by Lockheed…
- p. 90 …CIA, which then placed an order with
Lockheed for 29 U-2s in configurations to be…
- p. 107 …U-2
cover story stating that a Lockheed-developed aircraft would be flown
by the USAF…
- p. 143 …Lockheed mechanics
had mounted the various RAINBOW devices on the prototype U-2, a
Lockheed test…
- p. 144 …Unable to restart the power plant, Lockheed tesi: pilot
Robert Sieker bailed out but was struck…
- p. 145 …The loss of one of Lockheed's best test pilots. as well as the pro
totype…
- p. 157 …As a substitute,
Lockheed began working to develop a paint with radar-suppressant
qualities, but this…
- p. 162 …After a series of tests over Edwards AFB, Lockheed began coating
the U-2s with a…
- p. 188 …Although it had been refurbished by
Lockheed and now had the more powerful 175 engine that…
- p. 199 …In the meantime Pow1ers began working for Lockheed
as a U-2 pilot. In March 1963…
- p. 200 …Beschloss claims that Powers was tired by Lockheed
for criticizing the Agency in his memoirs (which…
- p. 209 …2
One week later Colonel Geary called to order Lockheed to up
grade six older U…
- p. 211 …In May 1961, Lockheed began modifying Agency U-2s so that
they could be refueled in…
- p. 220 …story, which
was that its pilots were Lockheed employees on a ferry flight to
Puerto Rico…
- p. 230 …for Detachment C
Late in l 958, Lockheed began refitting the Agency's 13 remaining
U…
- p. 235 …STPOLLY
added the more advanced Lockheed P3A in 1963. Between 1955 and
1967, when the CIA…
- p. 236 …U-2 missions, and the Air Force, which had
Lockheed P-2V7 and P3A
reconnaissance aircraft
- p. 238 …The planes were maintained by Lockheed mechanics under con
tract to the CIA. The Agency attempted…
- p. 255 …All Air Force and CIA U-2s were or
dered back to Lockheed for ultrasonic inspection…
- p. 260 …The Agency dispatched several pilots to Taiwan under the cover
of Lockheed employees working on a…
- p. 264 …G in California-with three more at Lockheed undergo
ing repair. The Agency had originally ordered…
- p. 265 …Francis Gary Powers was one of the Lockheed test pilots who
checked out this new aircraft…
101
Following the success of this first mission, Bissell was eager to
begin overflights of the Soviet Union. But even after the President
granted his approval on 21 June, such missions could not yet take
place for two reasons. First, President Eisenhower had agreed with a
CIA and State Department recommendation that West German
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer be informed in advance of US plans to
overfly the Soviet Union from bases in Germany (in keeping with ex
isting policies Adenauer was not informed about overflights of
Eastern Europe). Second, Soviet party chief Nikita Khrushchev had
invited representatives of the US Air Force to the Moscow Air Show,
which opened on 23 June 1956. Led by Air Force Chief of Staff
Nathan F. Twining, the delegation would be in the Soviet Union for a
week, and General Twining requested that no overflights of the Soviet
Union be staged until the Air Force delegation had left.11
Both of these restrictions on overflights of the Soviet Union
were cleared up by the end of June. Accompanied by General Cabell
and the Chief of Station for Germany, Tracy Barnes, Bissell briefed
Chancellor Adenauer and his trusted adviser, State Secretary Hans
_ Globke, on 27 June. Adenauer enthusiastically endorsed the project.11
A few days later the Air Force delegation returned from
Moscow, but now unfavorable weather prevented the start of opera
tions against the Soviet Union.
While waiting for the clouds over the Soviet Union to clear,
Detachment A carried out two more overflights of Eastern Europe on
2 July 1956: mission 2009 over Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
Bulgaria; and mission 2010 over East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and
Romania. That afternoon Bissell and DDCI Cabell gave President
Eisenhower a detailed briefing on the first U-2 overflight, which the
President found "very interesting, very positive." Eisenhower was
anxious to know, however, whether radars had tracked the aircraft.
Bissell replied that, although East European radars had picked up the
20 June flight, radar operators had misread the altitude as only 42,000
feet. He added that the Agency was awaiting reports on that morn
ing's flights to see if they, too, had been detected. Noting that the U-2
" Nathan F. Twining, Neither Liberty nor Safety (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston,
1966), pp. 259-260; OSA History, chap. 11, p. 27 (TS Codeword).
"' OSA History, chap. 11. p. 28 (TS Codeword).
6eeret NOFGRN
Chapter 3
~eeret