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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …following day, when the next U-2 mission f m the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 ( 18 March 1957), OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 7…
  • p. 142 …where they would not interfere with the control surfaces. At the ends of these poles, completely…
  • p. 147 …To take ad vantage of these weaknesses, Detachment C staged three missions from Alaska into the…
  • p. 156 …After these missions, penetrat ion overflights became a rarity. There would be only six more during…
  • p. 167 …U-2 missions. To handle U-2 material, the British created a new control system, which…
  • p. 168 …The British missions would be operationally controlled by CIA project headquarters. Soon afterward four British pilots…
  • p. 169 …where the United Kingdom carried out 27 missions during the two years its pi lots took…
  • p. 170 157 Sec, et MOF'ORI\I Chapter 3 May 1959, and used to fly weather missions…
  • p. 180 …The excellent photography from tnis mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts diid…
  • p. 188 …some Soviet airborne-missile fire-control systems. Operation GRAND SLAM, mission 4154 and the 24th deep…
  • p. 191 …key project personnel assembled in the Agency control center that morning (with the exception of Bissell…
  • p. 196 …in cor respondence with Abel's "wife., (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November…
  • p. 204 …in .the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 237 …In reality, however, the United States would maintain strict control over the missions to be flown…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
  • p. 348 …System-I used S- and X-band ELINT receivers to collect ground-controlled intercept and air…
  • p. 400 387 Sec1 et NOFORN mission 2023 108 mission 2029 124 mission 3086 200 mission 3088 200…
97
Even though President Eisenhower had approved every stage of
the U-2's development, knowing full well that the aircraft was being
built to fly over the Soviet Union, the actual decision to authorize
such flights was very difficult for him. He remained concerned that
overflights could poison relations with the Soviet Union and might
even lead to hostilities. One argument that helped overcome the
President's reluctance was the CIA's longstanding contention that U-2
flights might actually go undetected because Soviet radars would not
be able to track aircraft at such high altitudes. This belief was based
on a 1952 study of Soviet World War II-vintage radars and on 1955
tests using US radars, which-unknown to US officials-were not as
effective as Soviet radars against high-altitude targets. Shortly before
U-2 operations began, however, the CIA's Office of Scientific
Intelligence (OSI) conducted a vulnerability study of the U-2 that was
published on 28 May 1956. The study's conclusion was that "Maxi
mum Soviet radar detection ranges against the Project aircraft at ele
vation in excess of 55,000 feet would vary from 20 to 150 miles....
In our opinion, detection can therefore be assumed." The OSI study
added, however, "It is doubtful that the Soviets can achieve consis-
. tent tracking of the Project vehicle." 9 Completed just thr~e weeks be
fore the initation of overflights, this study seems to have had little
impact on the thinking of the top project officials. They continued to
believe that the Soviets would not be able to track the U-2 and might
even fail to detect it, except for possible vague indications. 10
Soviet radars were not President Eisenhower's only concern.
Also fearing that a malfunction might cause a U-2 to crash inside the
Soviet Union, he asked Allen Dulles what the consequences would
be. The President's staff secretary, Col. Andrew J. Goodpaster, who
was present at virtually all White House meetings on the U-2 project
and served as the President's intermediary to the CIA on this issue,
later recalled:
Allen '.s approach was that we were unlikely to lose one. If we did
lose one, the pilot would not survive. . . . We were told-and it
was part of our understanding of the situation-that it was al
most certain that the plane would disintegrate and that we could
• OSA Histor;,; chap. 11, p. 31 (TS Codeword). For the belief that the U-2 might go unde
tected see the Leghorn interview and Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace. 1956-1961
(New York, 1965), p. 41.
"' Richard M. Bissell, Jr., interview by Gregory W. Pedlow, tape recording, Farmington,
Connecticut. 28 October I988 (S).
Sec, et NOFORN
Chapter 3
Secaet

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.