Documents / Official release
CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974
Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
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the Sea of Japan on 13 June 1952 was probably also…
- p. 38 …off to about 6
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and delivered only 10.200 pounds of thrust at sea level; the resulting
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Kazalinsk, Aral Sea
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Baltic states
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126
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- p. 382 …23-24, 109, 139, 143, 164
Kara Sea
142
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135
Kazakhstan
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- p. 385 …301
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PREFACE
When the Central Intelligence Agency came into existence in 1947,
no one foresaw that, in less than a decade, it would undertake a
major program of overhead reconnaissance, whose principal purpose
would be to fly over the Soviet Union. Traditionally, the military
services had been responsible for overhead reconnaissance, and
flights deep into unfriendly territory only took place during wartime.
By the early I 950s, howe v,er, the United States had an urgent and
growing need for strategic :intelligence on the Soviet Union and its
satellite states. At great risk, US Air Force and Navy aircraft had
been conducting peripheral reconnaissance and shallow-penetration
overflights, but these missions were paying a high price in lives lost
and increased international tension. Furthermore. many important
areas of the Soviet Union lay beyond the range of existing reconnais
sance aircraft. The Air Force had therefore begun to develop a
high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft that would be able to conduct
deep-penetration reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his civilian scientific advisers
feared that the loss of such an aircraft deep in Soviet territory could
lead to war and therefore authorized the development of new non
military aircraft, first the U-2 and later the A-12 OXCART, to be
manned by civilians and operated only under cover and in the
greatest secrecy. Primary responsibility for this new reconnaissance
program was assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency, but the Air
Force provided vital support.
The Agency's manned overhead reconnaissance program lasted
20 years. It began with President Eisenhower's authorization of the
U-2 project in late 1954 and ended with the transfer of the remaining
Agency U-2s to the Air Force in 1974. During this period the CIA
developed a successor to the U-2, the A- 12 OXCART, but this ad
vanced aircraft saw little operational use and the program was
canceled in 1968 after the Air Force deployed a fleet of similar air
craft, a military variant of the A-12 called the SR-71.
Neither of these aircraft remai ns secret today. A great deal of in
formation about the U-2 and its overflight program became known to
the public after I May 1960, when the Soviet Union shot down a CIA
U-2 and publicly tried its pilot. Francis Gary Powers. Four years
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About this file
Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.