Documents / Official release
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
“Donald A. Johnson”17 pages
96 See1 et NOFOAN Chapter 3 Nathan Twining prepared a paper for the President outlining "AQUATONE Operational Plans." In the meantime, President Eisenhower had entered Walter Reed Hospital for tests for an abdomi nal ailment that turned out to be ileitis, requiring an operation. During his recovery from surgery, Eisenhower would make his final decision on the overflight program.7 PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S ATTITUDE TOWARD OVERFLIGHTS The President had mixed feelings about overflights of the Soviet Union. Aware that they could provide extremely valuable intelligence about Soviet capabilities, he, nevertheless, remained deeply con cerned that such flights brought with them the risk of starting a war. From the very beginning of the U-2 program, President Eisenhower had worked to minimize the possibility that overflights could lead to hostilities. He had always insisted that overflights by military aircraft were too provocative, and in 1954 he had therefore supported the Land committee's proposal for an unarmed civilian aircraft instead of the military reconnaissance planes favored by the Air Force. For the same reason, Eisenhower had resisted attempts by the Air Force to take the U-2 program away from the CIA in 1955. In fact, the President's desire to avoid secret reconnaissance mis sions over the Soviet Union, with all their risks, led him to make his famous "Open Skies" proposal in the summer of 1955, when the U-2 was still under development but making good progress. At the Geneva summit conference on 21 July 1955, President Eisenhower offered to provide airfields and other facilities in the United States for the Soviet Union to conduct aerial photography of all US military in stallations if the Soviet Union would provide the United States with similar facilities in Russia. Not surprisingly, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev almost immediately rejected Eisenhower's offer. Although the President had hoped that the Soviet Union would accept his proposal. he was prepared for rejection. While Open Skies was still being considered, Eisenhower had stated, 'Tl\ give it one shot. Then if they don't accept it, we'll fly the U-2."x ' Ibid., pp. 23-25 and anne:( 73. "AQUATONE Operational Plans,.. 31 May 1956 (TS Codeword). ·' Quoted in Beschloss. Mayday, p. 105. Secaet
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.