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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 11 …At great risk, US Air Force and Navy aircraft had been conducting peripheral reconnaissance and shallow…
  • p. 16 …As a result, in the late 1940s, the US Air Force and Navy began trying to…
  • p. 17 …Two months later, on 7 October 1952, Soviet fighter aircraft stalked and shot down a US…
  • p. 72 …The terminology used to describe U-2 aircraft and pilots also played a part in maintaining…
  • p. 94 …The committee issued its l ist of cargets for the use of the entire intelli gence…
  • p. 147 …The Agency then turned co the Navy, which granted permission for Detachmernt C to use the…
  • p. 180 …James Doolittle urged President Eisenhower to use overflights of the Soviet Union to the maximum degree…
  • p. 223 …by Air Force and Navy reconnais sance aircraft. President Kennedy used NPIC photographs to i llustrate…
  • p. 273 …Charyk, and his Navy counterpart, Garrison Norton. Designers from several air craft manufacturers also attended some…
  • p. 283 …This engine had originally been developed for the Navy's large, jet-powered flying boat, the…
  • p. 297 …The need for additional bui ldings on the base was met by the Navy. Three surplus…
  • p. 298 …After hearing Bissell and Holcomb's suggestion that the 158 might be used in future Navy…
  • p. 348 …Following modifications to make System-VII suitable for use by the Navy, the designation was changed…
  • p. 353 …In 1968 tests on an AQUILINE prototype at Randsburg Wash on the US Navy's Naval…
  • p. 401 …247, 328 US Marine Corps Reserve 14 US Military Academy at West Point 329 US Navy…
Seeret NOFORP•
Chapter 2
88
These positive results from Project GENETRIX did not outweigh
the political liabilities of the international protesLS. CIA officials be
came concerned that the ill will generated by balloon overflights could
sour the Eisenhower administration on all overflights. including those
by the U-2. which was just about ready for deployment. Therefore.
DDCI Cabell wrote to Air Force Chief of Staff Twining in February
1956 to warn against further balloon flights because of the ..additional
political pressures being generated against all balloon operations and
overflights. thus increasing the di ffi.culties of policy decisions which
would permit such operations in the: future." 73
In addition to its concern for tlhe future of the U-2 program. the
Agency feared that President Eisenhower's anger at balloon over
flights might result in the curtailment of the balloon program that the
Free Europe Committee-a covert Agency operation based in West
Germany-used to release propaganda pamphlets over Eastern
Europe.
AQUATONE BRIEFINGS FOR :SELECTED
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Although know ledge of the U-2 project was a closely guarded se
cret within both the Agency and the Eisenhower administration,
DCI Dulles decided that a few key members of Congress should be
told about the project. On 24 February 1956. Dulles met with
Senators Leverett Saltonstall and Richard B. Russell , the ranking
members of the Senate Armed Services Committee and its subcom
mittee on the CIA. He shared with them the details of Project
AQUATONE and then asked their opinion on whether some mem
bers of the House of Representati ves should also be in formed. As a
resu lt of the senators' recornmendllttion that the senior members of
the House Appropriations Committee shou ld be briefed, Dul les later
met with its ranking members, Representatives John Taber and
Clarence Cannon. Official Congress.ional knowledge of the U-2 pro
ject remained confined to this small group for the next four years.
The House Armed Services Committee and its CIA subcomrninee
did not recei\·e a CIA briefing on the U-2 project until after the loss
of Francis Gary Powers's U-2 over the Sov iet Union in May 1960.7
"
" Philip G. Strong. Attachment 10 Mcmoran<llum for DCI Dulks...Projcct GENETRIX
Summary." 15 Fcbruary 1956. OSI records (S)1.
" John S. Warn.:r. Lcgislativc Counsel. McrnoranJum for the Rccord ...AQUATONE
Bri.:tings:· 18 Novc:mbc:r 1957. Office of C,ongressional Affairs rci:onJs. job 61-357.
box 2 (S): Wam.:r interview (S).
Secr:et

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.