Documents / Official release
This is Section 5 of the FBI's flying disk file 62-HQ-83894, made up of 1949 and 1950 correspondence. Most of it covers a letter sent to Walter Winchell by Peter Camerlon Jones, who said he saw a silver top-shaped object near Los Angeles in 1947. The Los Angeles office could not find him, and the Bureau suggested the letter was a prank. The section also holds a Navy intelligence report on 6 or 7 discs seen over southern Oregon on 27 May 1949, plus several letters from citizens.
From the source:Release of 2026-05-08 Incident: N/A, N/A. The FBI's 62-HQ-83894 case file includes investigative records, eyewitness testimonies, and public reports concerning Unidentified Flying Objects and flying discs documented between June 1947 and July 1968. The records include high-profile incident accounts, photographic evidence from sites like Oak Ridge, TN, and technical proposals regarding potential propulsion systems. Additional topics include convention programs, researcher accounts, and extensive media coverage from the period. This file is partially posted on FBI vault with more redactions and some pages missing. Included here is the complete case file with several newly declassified pages and only minor redactions.
“Cooper”1 page
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On the morning of March 7, 1950, Special Agent McSWAIN of this office was advised by Mr. HOWARD WOODSIDE, U. S. AEC Security Division, of steps taken by AEC in this regard. Mr. WOODSIDE stated that immediately upon receiving the report from me, he had made the matter known to the proper authorities at AEC and early the following morning he had conversed with Colonel JOHN MEADE, 3rd Army Headquarters, Atlanta, Georgia, and apprised him of the matter. Mr. WOODSIDE stated he also conversed with 14th Air Force Headquarters at Greenville, South Carolina and advised them of the matter. He stated that this was strictly in accordance with the plans drawn up between AEC and the armed forces for protection against air or land assault. He continued that the AEC has neither the facilities nor the equipment with which to defend itself in such emergencies and that such responsibility had been assumed by these agencies of the military forces. It would appear from the manner in which this incident was handled that despite the fact that all agencies seemed to be operating in the manner prescribed by agreement, and although each was apprised of the action being taken by the other and cooperating in every respect, there nevertheless seemed to be an impressive lack of any agency actually taking the responsibility for the situation and taking any action to verify or disprove the threat. Had a similar incident occurred wherein an actual threat against the physical security of the AEC Installation had been experienced, it is not implausible to believe that a similar confused fixing of final authority would have been found. It should be noted that many hours elapsed from the receiving of the first report until such time as any reasonable conclusion could be reached concerning the matter and nothing of a positive nature with regard to any action being taken had been had during all that time. While it is now felt that this entire matter was in a manner of speaking "dry run", it nevertheless warrants some consideration from a procedural standpoint and might be worthy of discussion at some liaison meeting in the future. The Bureau will be immediately advised if there are any further developments in this matter.
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. The text was read from the page images by GLM-OCR; expect the odd misread word. 209 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.