Documents / Official release

Gemini 5 Technical Debriefing, Part II, 1965

National Aeronautics and Space Administration · 1965 · 325 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a preliminary Part II transcript of the Gemini 5 (GT-5) flight crew debriefing, prepared by the Spacecraft Operations Branch of NASA's Flight Crew Support Division and dated September 2, 1965. It records astronauts Cooper and Conrad at the Crew Quarters, Cape Kennedy. They discuss how the spacecraft systems worked, including the platform and the OAMS thruster failures. The transcript also covers operational checks, visual sightings, experiments, training, premission planning, and medical aspects. It was originally classified Confidential.

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 Incident: August 30 - September 2, 1965, Cape Kennedy, Florida. This document is a preliminary transcript (Part II) derived from voice recordings of the Gemini 5 flight crew technical debriefing. NASA conducted this debriefing between August 30, 1965, and September 2, 1965, at the Crew Quarters, Cape Kennedy, Florida. Astronauts L. Gordon Cooper and Charles “Pete” Conrad described observing debris and “snow” and “all sorts of glittering pieces of this, that and the other thing” in the “Visual Sightings” section of the document (pages 157-220).

75ak0tr4f.lDEt-4TIAL
all right.
Conrad Yes, it was address 03 and address 10 and they ver
ified okay and that seemed to convince everybody
except me that the load was correct and my mistake,
in retrospect, I should have made them ,transmit the
load and either satisfied myself that the DCS light
had burned out, or that the operation did take place
truly in the ma.mter in which it was supposed to
and it did light the DCS light . He knew the TR
was right because he had his TR clock synched in
with the spacecraft TR.
Cooper And he assumed the load was right because he got
maps back on it, but ... . I'm not too sure I .. . .
Conrad Yes, that's pretty dangerous. Pretty dangerous .
Cooper I think this is it as I jus t pointed out to J . B.
and we were discussing in the corridor here, my
feelings on it are right now are real strongly, that
my recommendation would be to piloia during really
critical time periods, "I'd just turn the DCS
circuit breaker off." I wouldn't even fiddle with
it because that one violation that of everything
we had agreed on has just completely destroyed my
confidence in the whole set up. That's all it takes
is that one time just to completely foul you up .
0'8HF+9E►.IW.L

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 325 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.