Documents / Official release

Gemini 5 Technical Debriefing, Part II, 1965

National Aeronautics and Space Administration · 1965 · 325 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a preliminary Part II transcript of the Gemini 5 (GT-5) flight crew debriefing, prepared by the Spacecraft Operations Branch of NASA's Flight Crew Support Division and dated September 2, 1965. It records astronauts Cooper and Conrad at the Crew Quarters, Cape Kennedy. They discuss how the spacecraft systems worked, including the platform and the OAMS thruster failures. The transcript also covers operational checks, visual sightings, experiments, training, premission planning, and medical aspects. It was originally classified Confidential.

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 Incident: August 30 - September 2, 1965, Cape Kennedy, Florida. This document is a preliminary transcript (Part II) derived from voice recordings of the Gemini 5 flight crew technical debriefing. NASA conducted this debriefing between August 30, 1965, and September 2, 1965, at the Crew Quarters, Cape Kennedy, Florida. Astronauts L. Gordon Cooper and Charles “Pete” Conrad described observing debris and “snow” and “all sorts of glittering pieces of this, that and the other thing” in the “Visual Sightings” section of the document (pages 157-220).

  • p. 196 …But we were looking at that scr ewy gray- - Well , I 1 11 tell you , we…
  • p. 198 …jumbled and it's a real dim gray area there you ' re going through just for…
  • p. 317 …The gray interior paint flecks off of the guard bars and off several areas of the…
301
Conrad
FCSD Rep
Conrad
,
I
What do you mean by operational check, you were
talking about system checks; in flight?
Yes, flight plan training. . .
Operation checks.
Thruster ill umination . Well, I don't have much
feel for that one way or another other than what I
said earlier this morning-- yes, I think I don't
know why it's as plain as the nose on my face but
I think we l eaped off the wrong assumption--that
everything was going to run right without checki ng
and I think that we shoul d flight plan up the first
orbit now with more checks in it. That was a very
poor assumption on this part , the more I even think
about it , because it was a perfectly likel y situation
to have some part of those three systems to be not
working right , and it would have been a simpl e matter
to have gone to the secondary scanners and el imina
ting the problem at the very beginning that we had ,
but we weren't smart enough to know that . We are
now .

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 325 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.