Documents / Official release

Gemini 5 Technical Debriefing, Part II, 1965

National Aeronautics and Space Administration · 1965 · 325 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a preliminary Part II transcript of the Gemini 5 (GT-5) flight crew debriefing, prepared by the Spacecraft Operations Branch of NASA's Flight Crew Support Division and dated September 2, 1965. It records astronauts Cooper and Conrad at the Crew Quarters, Cape Kennedy. They discuss how the spacecraft systems worked, including the platform and the OAMS thruster failures. The transcript also covers operational checks, visual sightings, experiments, training, premission planning, and medical aspects. It was originally classified Confidential.

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 Incident: August 30 - September 2, 1965, Cape Kennedy, Florida. This document is a preliminary transcript (Part II) derived from voice recordings of the Gemini 5 flight crew technical debriefing. NASA conducted this debriefing between August 30, 1965, and September 2, 1965, at the Crew Quarters, Cape Kennedy, Florida. Astronauts L. Gordon Cooper and Charles “Pete” Conrad described observing debris and “snow” and “all sorts of glittering pieces of this, that and the other thing” in the “Visual Sightings” section of the document (pages 157-220).

  • p. 5 …257 MISSION CONTROL 13. l GO/NO GO ••. . ... •. ....... ... ... . . . . ...... •• •. •• • ... . 261 13. 2 FLA and CLA Updates .. .. .... ... ... ....... . .. ... .. . .. 261…
  • p. 275 I Conrad We didn't always agree with Mission Control. One example--! would have l oved…
  • p. 276 …Anything else on the fuel cells , batteries, or mission control? Conrad No . 13 . 4 F'light…
  • p. 277 …Cooper I do to , but we are talking here about flight plan changes in mission controlling…
  • p. 278 …Mission Control for syst ems . I think the biggest handle you have on systems is right…
279
It is a great deal of difference.
Conrad Yes , it was a pretty tight system. This is probably
a function of each individual syst em because I
remember Jim mentioning the fact that it was so much
sloppier in Rate Command RCS and there is a differ
ence in the tolerance. But it sure wasn't apparent
to us. Both the OAMS and RCS Rate Command systems
were just as tight as they could be.
Cooper Well, the OAMS Rate Command system definitely was
tighter because you could come zapping around with it
and the second you let go of the handle it stopped
right there . Barn, it never even quivered , just
held right there .
Conrad Yes, we must have had an outstanding set of rate
gyros. The RCS Rate Command there had a wider
band. There was so much power and authority
in the RCS Rate Command that it actually gave me
a little bit of problem just hitting the point,
getting lined up on it for retrofire . There was just
so much authority you had trouble getting just
small amounts of control force until you got
used to it. There was so much power there ,
almost more power than you needed for fine
contr ol . It would be interesting to simulate

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 325 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.