Documents / Official release
This is a preliminary Part II transcript of the Gemini 5 (GT-5) flight crew debriefing, prepared by the Spacecraft Operations Branch of NASA's Flight Crew Support Division and dated September 2, 1965. It records astronauts Cooper and Conrad at the Crew Quarters, Cape Kennedy. They discuss how the spacecraft systems worked, including the platform and the OAMS thruster failures. The transcript also covers operational checks, visual sightings, experiments, training, premission planning, and medical aspects. It was originally classified Confidential.
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 Incident: August 30 - September 2, 1965, Cape Kennedy, Florida. This document is a preliminary transcript (Part II) derived from voice recordings of the Gemini 5 flight crew technical debriefing. NASA conducted this debriefing between August 30, 1965, and September 2, 1965, at the Crew Quarters, Cape Kennedy, Florida. Astronauts L. Gordon Cooper and Charles “Pete” Conrad described observing debris and “snow” and “all sorts of glittering pieces of this, that and the other thing” in the “Visual Sightings” section of the document (pages 157-220).
, 19 of doing experiments on the fifth day, and we had had a little trouble alining the platform. What was happening, apparently was the number 7 thruster was getting cranky, but we also knew we were vent ing hydrogen and we knew this because we were getting some torqueing out of that. At the t i me Gordo was having trouble ali ning the Platform, we thought it was because the hydrogen was venting. Finally Gardo said, "There's something wrong with t the control systems. " Once we deci ded there was something wrong wi th the control system, that ' s when it went just like back i n the simulator. We shut everything down, went to Direct, thought about it for a second and turned off all the circuit breakers , turned them all back on one at a time , tested all of the thrusters and, sure enough , when we got to number 7, it was out, completely out. Conrad So then I tri ed secondary ACME bias power. We tried the seconday yaw and the secondary attitude drivers with no effect so we were relatively as sured that something had happened in either the hand controller or the fuel was not feeding. We decided to power down r i ght there , which we did , and we advised flight of what the problem was . £ 8.M&HW~Jl~i I
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 325 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.